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In the paper I try to answer the question, whether there is a genuine constitutional theory of ‘illiberal 
constitutionalism,’ recently advocated in some East-Central European member states of the European 
Union, especially in Hungary and Poland. As I demonstrate, court ideologists of populist autocrats use 
Carl Schmitt’s concept of political sovereignty and collective identity of the people, or misuse Max 
Weber’s leader democracy or Richard Bellamy’s or others’ political constitutionalism ideas to legitimize 
authoritarian aims. I argue that the constitutional concept, which rejects liberalism as a constitutive 
precondition of democracy, cannot be in compliance with the traditional idea of liberal democratic 
constitutionalism. This concept has nothing to do with any majoritarian constitutional model based on 
the separation of power, or with political constitutionalism, or any kind of weak judicial review, and it 
misuses the concept of constitutional identity.  
One of the reasons of the illiberal turn has been that there was a lack of consensus about liberal 
democratic values at the time of the transition. In the beginning of the democratic transitions in these 
new democracies, preference was given to general economic effectiveness over mass civic and political 
engagement. According to some authors, the prospects for liberal constitutional democracy in the newly 
independent states of Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989–90 transition were diminished by 
a technocratic, judicial control of politics, which blunted the development of civic constitutionalism, 
civil society, and participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the technocratic 
machinery of legal constitutionalism. But, there is nothing to suggest that an earlier and more 
participatory constitution-making process would have prevented the populist turn. Those proponents of 
participatory constitutionalism do not sufficiently take into account the rise of populism and the lack of 
civic interest in constitutional matters, due to poor constitutional culture. The recent success of 
illiberalism in the region seems to indicate that the special historical circumstances require a longer 
period of time the build up a liberal democratic political and constitutional culture. But the democratic 
backsliding is not a proof of the failure of liberal democracy altogether, as illiberal leaders and their 
court ideologists want people to believe. 
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Illiberalism can be understand as a critical reaction to liberalism. The subject of illiberal criticism are 
both liberal theories and liberal societies. As Stephen Holmes argues, illiberals or antiliberals are 
unwilling to examine liberal theories and liberal societies separately, because they assume that liberal 
societies perfectly embody liberal ideas, therefore failing of liberal societies follow directly from the 
inadequacy of liberal principles1. This paper will discuss the current state of play of both illiberal theories 
and illiberal societies in East Central Europe. 
Also, illiberal critics of liberalism portrays and demonizes liberalism as a single coherent phenomenon. 
But for instance conservative liberals have little in common with social democratic ones, or neo-liberals 
with classical ones2. As Ralf Dahrendorf has rightly pointed out, Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper 
may well both be seen as liberal thinkers, but their views are quite different from each other3.  
While discussing illiberalism the focus of this paper will be institutional. From this perspective the main 
object of illiberal critique is liberal democracy, which in my view isn’t merely a limit on the public 
power of the majority, but also presupposes rule of law, checks and balances, and guaranteed 
fundamental rights. This means that there is no democracy without liberalism, and there also cannot be 
liberal rights without democracy4. In this respect, there is no such a thing as an ‘illiberal or anti-liberal 
democracy.’5 Those who perceive democracy as liberal by definition also claim that illiberalism is 
inherently hostile to values associated with constitutionalism, as an institutional aspect of liberal 
democracy: separation of powers, constraints on the will of the majority, human rights, and protections 
for minorities. Therefore, the also oxymoronic ‘illiberal’ or ‘populist’ constitutionalism6 is necessarily 
authoritarian in character7.  
 
*  Gábor Halmai is Professor and Chair of Comparative Constitutional Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. 
 1  See S. Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 1993. XIV.  
 2  See J. Zielonka, Counter-Revolution, Oxford University Press, 2018. 20.  
 3  R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London: Times Books, 1990. 25-26. 
 4  Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Über den internen Zusammenhang von Rechtsstaat und Demokratie, in Zum Begriff der Verfassung. 
Die Ordnung der Politischen, hrsg., Ulrich Preuss, Fischer, 1994. 83-94. The English version see Jürgen Habermas, Rule 
of Law and Democracy, European Journal of Philosophy, 1995/3. Also Juan Juan José Linz and Alfred Stepan assert that 
if governments, even being freely elected violate the right of individuals and minorities, their regimes are not democracies. 
See Juan José Linz and Alfred Stepan, ‘ Toward Consolidated Diemocracies, 7/2 Journal of Democracy, 1996. 14, 15. 
Similarly, János Kis claims that there is no such thing as nonliberal democracy, or non-democratic liberalism. See János 
Kis, Demokráciából autokráciába. A rendszertipológia és az átmenet dinamikája [From Democracy to Autocracy. The 
System-typology and the Dinamics of the Transition], Politikatudományi Szemle, 2019/1. 45-74. Those critics, which argue 
that liberalism as a three hundreds year old concept predates liberal democracy forget that not only democracy but also 
liberalism presupposes general and equal suffrage.  
 5  J-W. Müller, ‘The Problem with 'Illiberal Democracy'.’ Project Syndicate. 21 January. 2016.  
 6  For instance, Paul Blokker considers ‘populist constitutionalism’ as an alternative, conservative understanding of 
constitutional order, which is, among other things is a reaction to injustices resulting from liberal democratic politics, to 
unbalanced emphasis on formalistic liberal institutions, rights, and norms, and an aggressive institutionalisation of a liberal 
understanding of law in the post-1989 transformation. See Paul Blokker, ‘Populist Constitutionalism,’ in Carlos de la Torre 
(ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Populism, Routledge, 2018; Paul Blokker, !Populism As a Constitutional Project!, 
17:2 ICON, 2019. Using Isaiah Berlin’s terminology on ‘false populism’ I argue somewhere else that this ‘authoritarian 
populist constitutionalism’ is only a rhetoric, and not a real populist appeal to the ‘people.’ See G. HALMAI, ’Populism, 
Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism’, 20 German Law Journal, No. 3. 2019.  
 7  Following Juan José Linz’s classical categories authoritarianism is inbetween democratic and totalitarian political system. 
See Juan José Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner, 2000. Writing about Franco’s Spain Linz has 
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Distinct from illiberal theories, the second part of the paper discusses three main relations of illiberal 
societies: the social, the economic and the political ones. Among other things, I want to figure out, 
whether the backsliding of liberalism in East-Central Europe is a proof or consequence of failure of 
liberal ideas. 
Illiberal Constitutional Theories 
Are There Such Things as ‘Illiberal or Nonliberal Constitutionalism’? 
Populist Autocrats Against Liberal Democracy and Constitutionalism 
In a speech delivered on July 26, 2014, before an ethnic Hungarian audience in the neighboring 
Romania, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán proclaimed his intention to turn Hungary into a state that ‘will 
undertake the odium of expressing that in character it is not of liberal nature.’ Citing as models he added:  
We have abandoned liberal methods and principles of organizing society, as well as the liberal way to 
look at the world . . . . Today, the stars of international analyses are Singapore, China, India, Turkey, 
Russia . . . and if we think back on what we did in the last four years, and what we are going to do in 
the following four years, then it really can be interpreted from this angle. We are . . . parting ways 
with Western European dogmas, making ourselves independent from them . . . If we look at civil 
organizations in Hungary, . . .we have to deal with paid political activists here . . . [T]hey would like 
to exercise influence . . . on Hungarian public life. It is vital, therefore, that if we would like to 
reorganize our nation state instead of it being a liberal state, that we should make it clear, that these 
are not civilians . . . opposing us, but political activists attempting to promote foreign interests . . . 
This is about the ongoing reorganization of the Hungarian state. Contrary to the liberal state 
organization logic of the past twenty years, this is a state organization originating in national interests8.  
Four years later at the same venue Orbán again expressed his support for illiberal democracy, adding 
that he considers Christian democracy as illiberal as well: 
There is an alternative to liberal democracy: it is called Christian democracy…Let us confidently 
declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian 
democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal.9 
In June 2019, after Fidesz was suspended from the center-right party family, EPP has set up a special 
committee to examine the Fidesz party's adherence to democratic standards. One of the questions the 
members of the committee, former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, former European Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy and former European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering 
addressed to Viktor Orbán has been: ‘Please explain what you mean by the expression ‘illiberal state’? 
Here is the Fidesz chairman and Hungarian Prime Minister’s response: 
 
already outlined the following four main charactersitics of authoritarianism: limited, not responsible political pluralism, 
without elaborate and guiding ideology, without political mobilization, and with formally ill-defined, but quite predictable 
limits of power. See Juan José Linz, ‘An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain’, in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party 
Systems, Eric Allard and Yrjo Littunen (eds.) Helsinki, 1970. About the constitutional markers of authoritarianism as a 
pretence of democracy, such as the lack of procedural rights, institutional guarantees and public discourse see Gábor Attila 
Tóth, Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Published online: 10 September 
2018. 
 8  See Viktor Orbán, Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014, Budapest Beacon, July 29, 2014, 
http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/. 
 9  See Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 28 July 2018. 
Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad). http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-29th-balvanyos-
summer-open-university-and-student-camp/ 
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We are Christian democrats and we are differing nowadays at least in three aspects from the liberals: 
The first one is the conviction that family is fundamental, and family is based on one man an one 
woman. We believe that this needs to be protected, which the liberals deny. Secondly, while the 
cultural life of every country is diverse, a Leitculture, a cultural tradition is present everywhere. In 
Hungary this is Christian culture. We respect other cultures, but our own has a prominent role for us, 
and it is our responsibility to preserve it. Liberals refuse this concept. The third aspect is that liberal 
democrats are everywhere pro-immigration while we are against immigration. So whether one admits 
it or not: Christian democrats are illiberals by definition10.  
In a conversation with the French philosopher, Bernard-Henry Lévy Orbán identified liberalism with 
totalitarianism, and illiberalism with true democracy: 
Liberalism gave rise to political correctness—that is, to a form of totalitarianism, which is the opposite 
of democracy. That’s why I believe that illiberalism restores true freedom, true democracy.11 
In July 2019 in the yearly Băile Tușnad/Tusnádfürdő Free University Orbán admitted that ‘illiberalism’ 
carries a negative connotation, and therefore he changed the terminology calling illiberalism ‘Christian 
liberty,’ which according to him is ‘a genuine model of a theory of state, a unique Christian democratic 
state.’ He made it clear however that ‘Christian liberty does not mean individual liberty, because 
‘individual freedoms can never encroach on the interests of the community. There is indeed a majority 
that must be respected, that is the foundation of democracy.’12  
In a speech, delivered in mid-September 2019 at the 12th congress of the Association of Christian 
Intelligentsia he said that ‘Christian liberty’ is superior to the individual liberty - defined by John Stuart 
Mill in his On Liberty -, which can only be infringed upon if the exercise of one’s liberty harms others. 
Christian liberty, by contrast, holds that we ought to treat others as we want to be treated. 13 ‘The 
teachings of ‘Christian liberty’ – he added - maintain that the world is divided into nations.’ As opposed 
to liberal liberty, which is based on individual accomplishments, the followers of ‘Christian liberty’ 
acknowledge only those accomplishments that also serve the common good. While liberals are 
convinced that liberal democracies will eventually join together to form a world government a’ la 
Immanuel Kant in the name of liberal internationalism, Christian liberty by contrast considers ‘nations 
to be as free and sovereign as individuals are, and therefore they cannot be forced under the laws of 
global governance.’ 
In the system ‘Christian liberty’ Hungary has a special place:  
We shouldn’t be afraid to declare that Hungary is a city built on a hill, which, as is well known, cannot 
be hidden. Let’s embrace this mission, let’s create for ourselves and show to the world what a true, 
deep, and superior life can be built on the ideal of Christian liberty. Perhaps this lifeline will be the 
one toward which the confused, lost, and misguided Europe will stretch its hand. Perhaps they will 
 
 10  The leaked letter has been published by Politico: https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-rejects-epp-concerns-rule-of-
law/ 
 11  Bernard-Henry Lévy, ‘How an Anti-totalitarian Militant Discovered Ultranationalism. After 30 years, I spoke with Viktor 
Orbán again’, The Atlantic, May 13, 2019. 
 12  http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/yes-to-democracy-no-to-liberalism/. As Yale law and history professor, Samuel Moyn 
pointed out President Trump has also begun to nudge the political culture to the same direction. He quoted Sohrab Ahmari, 
a conservative journalist, who approvingly explained Trump’s policy as re-ordering the common good and ultimately the 
‘Highest Good,’ that is, the Christian God – Moyn argues. See Samual Moyn, ‘We’Are in An Anti-Liberal Moment. 
Liberals Need Better Answers,’ The Washington Post, 21 June 2019.  
 13  http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-beszede-a-kereszteny-ertelmisegiek--szovetsegenek-kesz-xii-kongresszusan/. 
This time the webpage of the Prime Minister besides the original Hungarian text of the speech contains no English, but 
only a German language translation: http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/viktor-orbans-rede-auf-dem-kongress-des-verbandes-
der-christlichen-intellektuellen-kereszteny-ertelmisegiek-szovetsege-kesz/ 
Gábor Halmai 
4 Department of Law Working Papers 
also see the beauty of man’s work serving his own good, the good of his country, and the glory of 
God.14 
Another new element of the speech that Orbán puts ‘Christian liberty’ at the center of the ‘Christian 
democratic state’, ‘a new and authentic model of state and political theory,’ which has been reached in 
the last thirty years by two big steps. The first has been the liberal democratic transition in 1989, while 
the second, more important one is the national or Christian regime change in 2010.  
Regarding the new constitutional order, introduced by the 2011 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Orbán 
admitted that his party did not aim to produce a liberal constitution. He said:  
In Europe the trend is for every constitution to be liberal, this is not one. Liberal constitutions are 
based on the freedom of the individual and subdue welfare and the interest of the community to this 
goal. When we created the constitution, we posed questions to the people. The first question was the 
following: what would you like; should the constitution regulate the rights of the individual and create 
other rules in accordance with this principle or should it create a balance between the rights and duties 
of the individual. According to my recollection more than 80% of the people responded by saying that 
they wanted to live in a world, where freedom existed, but where welfare and the interest of the 
community could not be neglected and that these need to be balanced in the constitution. I received 
an order and mandate for this. For this reason the Hungarian constitution is a constitution of balance, 
and not a side-leaning constitution, which is the fashion in Europe, as there are plenty of problems 
there15.  
Orbán also refused separation of powers, checks and balances as concepts alien to his illiberal 
constitutional system:  
Checks and balances is a U.S. invention that for some reason of intellectual mediocrity Europe decided 
to adopt and use in European politics16. 
The ideological foundation of Orbán’s illiberalism can be found in the works of his two court ideologues, 
the sociologist and former liberal MP, Gyula Tellér and András Lánczi, a political scientist. It is easy to 
prove that Orbán in his 2014 speech on ‘illiberal democracy’ recited a study of Tellér published earlier 
on that year, what Orbán assigned as compulsory reading for all his ministers.17 Tellér claims that the 
‘system of regime-change’ has failed because the liberal constitution did not commit the government to 
protect national interests, therefore the new ‘national system’ has to strengthen national sovereignty, 
and with it the freedom of degree of government activity. This, Tellér argues is necessary against the 
moral command of the liberal rule of law regime, according to which ‘everything is allowed, what does 
not harm others’ liberty’. 
Lánczi’s antiliberal concept can be found in his book Political Realism and Wisdom, which was 
published in English in 2015, as well as in an article published in 2018, after Fidesz’ third consecutive 
 
 14  As Éva S. Balogh points out this passage is taken from the Gospel of Matthew, (5:13-15), without identifying it. See Éva S. 
Balogh, Orbán, the New Jesus Delivers His Sermon on the Mount, Hungarian Spectrum, 15 September 2019. 
https://hungarianspectrum.org/2019/09/15/orban-the-new-jesus-delivers-his-sermon-on-the-mount/  
 15  See A Tavares jelentés egy baloldali akció (The Tavares report is a leftist action), Interview with PM Viktor Orbán in the 
Hungarian Public Radio, Kossuth Rádió, July 5, 2013. 
 16  Interview with Bloomberg News, December 14, 2014. Similarly, Tünde Handó, head of the National Judicial Office, a close 
ally of Orbán said "The rule of law over the State, like, for example, in the United States, is not the right way". 
https://nepszava.hu/3029940_hando-nem-kell-a-birosagoknak-szembehelyezkedniuk-az-allammal 
 17  See Gyula Tellér, Született-e Orbán-rendszer 2010 és 2014 között? [Was an Orbán System Born between 2010 and 2014?], 
NAGYVILÁG, March 2014.  
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electoral victory18. Lánczi’s critique is an outright rejection of liberalism as a utopian ideology, which 
is—similar to Communism—incompatible with democracy.  
Similarly to Orbán, the that time Prime Minister Beata Szydło (with Kaczyński, ruling from behind the 
scenes as he holds no official post), have described the actions of the PiS government dismantling the 
independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and the ordinary courts as a blitz to install an illiberal state. 
In mid-September 2016 at a conference in the Polish town of Krynica, Orbán and Kaczyński proclaimed 
a ‘cultural counter-revolution’ aimed at turning the European Union into an illiberal project. A week 
later at the Bratislava EU summit, the prime ministers of the Visegrád 4 countries demanded a structural 
change of the EU in favour of the nation states.19 Witold Waszczykowski, Poland’s minister of foreign 
affairs expressing his own and his governing PiS party’s antiliberalism went as far as to mock liberalism 
as ‘a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians, who only use renewable energy and fight all form of 
religion’20.  
Ryszard Legutko, the main ideologue of PiS, similarly to his Hungarian counterpart, Lánczi, also likens 
liberal democracy with Communism both being fuelled by the ideas of modernization and progress21. 
Both Lánczi and Legutko assert together with other antiliberals with one voice that liberalism and 
Communism, or for that matter its ideology, Marxism are secretly allied and share a common ancestry 
that they are two offshoots of an Enlightenment tradition22. Legutko also accuses liberalism’s tendency 
to root out all forms of inequality, and that human right – as legal norms that promote equality become 
‘arbitrary claims, ideologically motivated, made by various political groups in blatant disregard of the 
common good.’23 
This critique of liberalism goes back to the concept of Volksgemeinschaft (national community), or 
völkisches Recht, one of the core principles of National Socialist law, which can be characterized 
negatively by rejection of the individualistic, normative concept of the people (Volk) as the sum of 
nationals of the State, as presented in the 1918 Weimar Constitution24. Volksgemeinschaft together with 
the Führerprinzip, the other main principle of National Socialist Weltanschauung aim to overcome 
individualism, hence it means strong anti-liberalism. Due the Carl Schmitt’s well-known flirts with 
National Socialism it isn’t surprising that the critical stance of the new illiberals towards liberal 
 
 18  See András Lánczi, The Renewed Social Contract–Hungary’s Elections, 2018, IX Hungarian Rev., May 2018, at 
http://www.hungarianreview.com/article/20180525_the_renewed_social_contract_hungary_s_elections_2018. A detailed 
analysis of Lánczi’s arguments see See Kim L. Scheppele, The Opportunism of Populists and the Defense of Constitutional 
Liberalism, 20 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 3, 2019.  
 19  Slawomir Sierakowski even speaks about an ‘illiberal international’. See S. Sierakowski, ‘The Polish Threat to Europe’, 
Project Syndicate, January 19, 2016. 
 20  https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/polen/hat-die-regierung-einen-vogel-44003034.bild.html 
 21  See Ryszard Legutko, The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies, 2016. 2-9.  
 22  This anti-liberal political theory is present outside East-Central Europe as well. For instance Patrick Deneen’s book, Why 
Liberalism Failed (2018) is directed at the left in the US targeting both contemporary progressivism and ’classical 
liberalism’ of conservatives. The Israeli political theorist Yoram Hazony, whose book The Virtue of Nationalism (2018) 
also crtiticizes those conservatives who defend liberal democracy. As Marc Plattner convinsingly argues, the common goal 
of all these thinkers is to conflate liberal democracy with contemporary progressivism and thus to suggest that conservatives 
should have no interest in supporting or defending liberal democracy. See M. Plattner, ’Illiberal Democary and the Struggle 
ont he Right’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 30, Number 1, January 2019. 16-17. 
 23  Legutko, ibid n. 21, 135. In a recent article, Paul Blokker characterises both Legutko and Lánczi as a conservative intellectual 
who has provided ideas for the conservative populist project, and important contribution to rethinking/re-imagining 
constitutional democracy in the contemporary European context. See Paul Blokker, ‘Populist Counter-Constitutionalism, 
Conservatism, and Legal Fundamentalism, European Constitutional Law, forthcoming. 
 24  About the role of Volksgemeinschaft in National Socialist law see Oliver Lepsius? ‘The Problem of Perceptions of National 
Socialist Law or: Was There A Constitutional Theory of National Socialism?’, in Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh 
Ghaleigh (eds.), Draker Legacies of Law in Europe. The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its 
Legal Traditions, Hart Publishing, 2003. 19-41.  
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constitutionalism is also related to a Schmittian understanding of the constitution, and to his critique of 
liberal constitutionalism and its conception of the rule of law25. The constitution in Schmitt’s view is an 
expression of ‘the substantial homogeneity of the identity and the will of the people’, and guarantee of 
the state’s existence, and ultimately any constitutional arrangement is grounded in, or originates from, 
an arbitrary act of political power. The absolute authority of the political will of the people overrides all 
constitutional requirements, which according to Schmitt are signs of depoliticization tendencies caused 
by liberal democracies. This is the reason that he elaborated The concept of the Political26 (Das 
Politisches) based on the distinction between friend and enemy, which is precisely the opposite of liberal 
neutrality27. 
In other words, in Schmitt’s view the basis of the constitution is ‘a political decision concerning the type 
and form of its own being’, made by the people as a ‘political unity’, based on their own free will. This 
political will ‘remains alongside and above the constitution.’28 Schmitt also portrays the people as an 
existential reality as opposed to the mere liberal representation of voters in parliament, holding therefore 
that Mussolini was a genuine incarnation of democracy. Schmitt goes so far as to claim the 
incompatibility of liberalism and democracy, and argues that plebiscitary democracy based on the 
homogeneity of the nation is the only true form of democracy. But Schmitt is talking about these 
intermittent plebiscites as a tool to tap the resource of consent by the governed within a ‘qualitative’ and 
strong totalitarian state, the authority of which rests on the military and the bureaucracy, and which 
cannot accept the existence of political opposition29. In other words the strong state cannot be liberal30. 
As Mattias Kumm argues, Carl Schmitt’s interpretation of democracy, inspired by Rousseau, and used 
by authoritarian populist nationalists, like Viktor Orbán as ‘illiberal democracy’, becomes an anti-
constitutional topos.31 The Hungarian political scientist, András Körösényi, implementing the Weberian 
concept calls the Orbán regime as ‘plebiscitary leader democracy’, where the activity of the leader (or 
Führer? – G.H.) is posteriorly approved by the people, but since this approval can be withdrawn this is 
 
 25  As Heiner Bielefeld demostrates Carl Schmitt systematically undersmines the liberal principle of the rule of law. See Heiner 
Bielefeld, ’Deconstruction of the Rule of Law. Carl Schmitt’s Philosophy of the Policial’, 82 Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophy, 1996. 379-396. 
 26  Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 2007.  
 27  See Heiner Bielefeld, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Systematic Reconstitruction and Countercriticism’, Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. X, No. 1. (January 1997). 67. 
 28  See Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 2008. 125-126. This idea is also shared by a part of the French constitutional 
doctrine, influenced by Rousseau’s general will. This is the reason that the representatives of this doctrine hold that during 
a constitutional transition a referendum is sufficient to legitimate a new constitution. See the French Constitutional 
Council’s approval of De Gaulle’s 1962 amendment to the 1958 Constitution, ignoring the Constitution’s amendment 
provisions.  
 29  See Carl Schmitt, Legalität and Legitimität, note 51, at 93-94. Quoted by Alexander Somek, Authoritarian Constitutionalism: 
Austrian Constitutional Doctrine 1933-1938 and Its Legacy, in Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National 
Socialism and Fascism Over Europe and Its legal Traditions (Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003), 
375. 
 30  About the revival of Carl Schmitt in the Hungarian political and constitutional theory see Attila Antal, ‘The Rebirth of the 
Political - A Schmittian Moment in Hungary,’ Transcript of the lecture given at the Constitutional systems in Middle 
Europe; The cycle of meetings about political ideas of Tadeusz Mazowiecki organized by Polska Fundacja im. Roberta 
Schumanaon 6th November 2017, Warsaw. https://www.academia.edu/35061692/The_Rebirth_of_the_Political_-
_A_Schmittian_Moment_in_Hungary_Transcript_of_Lecture?email_work_card=thumbnail. Also Zoltán Balázs, 
‘Political Theory in Hungary After the Regime Change’, 7 International Political Anthropology, 2014. no. 1, 5–26. On 
Schmitt’s influence of the Polish constitutional discourse see Dawid Bunikowski, ‘The crisis in Poland, Schmittian 
Questions, and Kaczyński's Political and Legal Philosophy, https://www.academia.edu/31450497/The_crisis_in_Poland_ 
and_Schmittian_questions _in_the_rule_of_law_debate 
 31  Mattias Kumm, Demokratie als verfassungsfeindlicher Topos, Verfassungsblog, Sept. 6, 2017.  
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still a democratic system32. In contrast, Wojciech Sadurski using Guillermon O’Donnell’s ‘delegative 
democracy’ concept characterises the Polish system after 2015 as ‘plebiscitary autocracy’, in which the 
electorate approves of governmental disregard of the constitution33. In Hungary even the electoral 
approval is manipulated, hence the formal democratic character of the regime can be also be questioned. 
This lead Larry Diamond to call the Hungarian sytem as ‘pseudo-democracy’34.  
Authoritarian Populism As A Rhetoric 
The illiberal regimes in Central and Eastern Europe manifest themselves populist, using anti-
representation and pro-direct democracy arguments. But in reality this is only a rhetoric, which does not 
necessarily correspond with these populists’ practice. For instance, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party tried to 
undermine the legitimacy of representation after losing the 2002 parliamentary elections35. He refused 
to concede defeat, declaring that ‘the nation cannot be in opposition, only the government can be in 
opposition against its own people’. After the 2010 electoral victory, he claimed that through the 
‘revolution at the voting booths’, the majority has delegated its power to the government representing 
it. This means that the populist government tried to interpret the result of the elections as the will of the 
people, viewed as a homogenous unit. Also, the Orbán government, which after in 2010 overthrowing 
its predecessor as a result of a popular referendum made it more difficult to initiate a valid referendum 
for its own opposition. While the previous law required only 25 percent of the voters to cast a vote, the 
new law requires at least 50 percent of those eligible to vote to take part, otherwise the referendum is 
invalid36. The ambivalence of authoritarian populists towards representation and referenda in 
government and in opposition applies to their attitude regarding established institutions. While they 
readily attack the ‘establishment’, while in opposition, they very much protect their own governmental 
institutions. The situation is different with transnational institutions, like the EU, which are also attacked 
 
 32  See András Körösényi, Weber és az Orbán-rezsim: plebiszciter vezéremokrácia Magyarországon [Weber and the Orbán-
regime: Plebisciter Leader Democracy in Hungary], Politikatudományi Szemle, 2017/4. 7-28. In a more recent interview 
however, Körösényi admitted that the for the witdrawal of approval currently a miracle is needed. See Csak a csoda segít 
[Only the Miracle Helps], hvg, 20 June 2019.  
 33  See Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown, Oxford Univesity Press, 2019. 242-243. Similarly, Juan José 
Linz to avoid confusion proposes the addition of adjectives to ‘authoritarianism’ rather than to ‘democracy’ for such 
regimes: for example ‘electoral authoritarianism.’ See Juan José Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne 
Rienner, 2000. 34. Also, Larry Diamond refers to ‘electoral authortarianism’ in hybrid regimes. See Larry Diamond, 
‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’ 13/2 Journal of Democracy, 2002. 21, 24. 
 34  „The test of a democracy is not whether the economy is growing, employment is rising, or more couples are marrying, but 
whether people can choose and replace their leaders in free and fair elections. This is the test that Hungary’s political system 
now fails. When Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party returned to power in 2010 with a parliamentary supermajority, they set 
about destroying the constitutional pillars of liberal democracy … By the 2014 elections, Orbán had rigged the system. 
Yes, multiparty elections continued, but his systematic degradation of constitutional checks and balances so tilted the 
playing field that he was able to renew his two-thirds majority in parliament with less than a majority of the popular vote 
(and did so again in 2018) ... Orbán has transformed Hungary into not an illiberal democracy but a pseudo-democracy”. 
See Larry Diamond, ‘How Democratic Is Hungary?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019. Similarly, Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan Way recently argued: “Clearly, Hungary is not a democracy. But understanding why requires a nuanced 
understanding of the line between democracy and autocracy … Orbán’s Hungary is a prime example of a competitive 
autocracy with an uneven playing field’. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, ‘How autocrats can rig the game and damage 
democracy’, The Washington Post, 4 January 2019. See also András Bozóki & Dániel Hegedűs, ‘An externally constrained 
hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union” (2018) Democratization 1173.  
 35  About the use of populist rhetoric by Viktor Orbán and his government see a more detailed description in my 
article ’Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism’, 20 German Law Journal, 3 (2019), 296-313. 
 36  It is the irony of fate that due to these more stringent conditions, the only referendum that the Orbán government initiated – 
one against the EU’s migration policy - failed. On 2 October 2016, Hungarian voters went to the polls to answer one 
referendum question: “Do you want to allow the European Union to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to 
Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly?”. Although 92 % of those who casted votes and 98 of all the valid 
votes agreed with the government, answering ‘no’ (6 % were spoiled ballots), the referendum was invalid because the 
turnout was only around 40 percent, instead of the required 50 percent. 
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by these autocratic populist governments as threats to their countries’ sovereignty37. A good example is 
again the Hungarian Parliament’s reaction to the European Parliament’s critical report from July 2013 
on the constitutional situation in Hungary. The Hungarian parliamentary resolution on equal treatment 
reads: ‘We, Hungarians, do not want a Europe any longer where freedom is limited and not widened. 
We do not want a Europe any longer where the Greater abuses his power, where national sovereignty is 
violated and where the Smaller has to respect the Greater. We have had enough of dictatorship after 40 
years behind the iron curtain.’ These words very much reflect the Orbán government’s view of ‘national 
freedom’, the liberty of the state (or the nation) to determine its own laws: ‘This is why we are writing 
our own constitution…And we don’t want any unconsolidated help from strangers who are keen to guide 
us…Hungary must turn on its own axis’.38  
Orbán repeated the same populist, nationalist mantra at the plenary debate of the European Parliament 
on 11 September 2018, when defying the Sargentini report, on the basis of which the Parliament 
launched Article 7 TEU proceedings against Hungary: ‘…you are not about to denounce a government, 
but a country and a people. You will denounce the Hungary, which has been a member of the family of 
Europe's Christian peoples for a thousand years; the Hungary which has contributed to the history of 
our great continent of Europe with its work and, when needed, with its blood. You will denounce the 
Hungary which rose and took up arms against the world's largest army, against the Soviets, which made 
the highest sacrifice for freedom and democracy, and, when it was needed, opened its borders to its East 
German brothers and sisters in distress. Hungary has fought for its freedom and democracy. I stand here 
now and I see that Hungary is being arraigned by people who inherited democracy, not needing to 
assume any personal risk for the pursuit of freedom. […] the report before you is an affront to the honor 
of Hungary and the Hungarian people. Hungary's decisions are made by the voters in parliamentary 
elections. What you are claiming is no less than saying that the Hungarian people are not sufficiently 
capable of being trusted to judge what is in their own interests. You think that you know the needs of 
the Hungarian people better than the Hungarian people themselves.’39  
Hence, I claim that autocrats’ populism is ‘false’40 and they only use populist rhetoric, but their decisive 
characteristics is authoritarianism. What makes them distinct from non-populist autocrats are the 
democratic elections through which they come to power, even though being in government they often 
change the electoral law to keep their power.  
Is There Such A Thing As Authoritarian Constitutionalism? 
Constitutionalism is often defined as ‘limited government.’ For instance Giovanni Sartori defines 
constitutionalism as ‘a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional 
arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure ‘limited government’’41. Also, András 
 
 37  Andrea Pin in the parallel special issue argues that supranational courts are partially also responsible for the rise of populism 
by judicialization of political choices and replacing national debates and rules. In my view this critique does not apply in 
the case of Member States of the EU, such as Hungary and Poland, where the democratic process is not operating 
satisfactorily, and the political institutions of the EU seem to be unable or unwilling to act. Here the CJEU or the ECtHR 
for that matters, despite their otherwise problematic de-politicized language, can be the last resort to enforce compliance 
with European values. See Andrea Pin, The Transnational Drivers of Populist Backlash in Europe: The Role of the Courts, 
XX GER L.J. XX (2019). 
 38  The English-language translation of excerpts from Orbán’s speech was made available by Hungarian officials, see e.g. 
Financial Times: Brussels Blog, 16 March 2012. 
 39  http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/address-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-
the-debate-on-the-so-called-sargentini-report 
 40  The term ‘false’ populism was used by Isaiah Berlin defining “the employment of populist ideas for undemocratic ends”. 
See To Define Populism, The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library, Isaiah Berlin 1968, The Isaiah Berlin Literary Trust 2013. 
Posted 14 October 2013. 6. http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/bibliography/bib111bLSE.pdf. 10. 
 41  See Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 The American Political Science Review, 1962. 855. 
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Sajó and Renáta Uitz describe constitutionalism as a liberal political philosophy that is concerned with 
limiting government42. The main aim of limiting government is to guarantee individual rights. In other 
words, modern constitutionalism is by definition liberal43. This does not mean, however, that 
constitutions cannot be illiberal or authoritarian. Therefore, it is legitimate to talk about constitutions in 
authoritarian regimes, as Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpler do in their book,44 but I do not agree with 
the use of the term ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’45 or ‘constitutional authoritarianism’.46  
Mark Tushnet for instance tries to generally pluralize the normative understanding of non-liberal 
constitutionalism, differentiating between an absolutist, a mere rule-of-law, and an authoritarian form 
of constitutionalism, Singapore being the main example of the latter47. Tushnet defines authoritarian 
constitutionalism as an intermediate normative model between liberal constitutionalism and 
authoritarianism48 that has moderately strong normative commitments to constitutionalism in nations 
with specific social and political problems, such as a high degree of persistent ethnic conflict.49 In other 
words, he refers to a distinct type of regime, wherein there are faulty practices and a constitution with 
an authoritarian content. 
In contrast to Tushnet’s understanding of authoritarian constitutionalism, which can also be considered 
as an empirical work about hybrid regimes, Roberto Niembro Ortega provides a more conceptual 
approach that refers to a very sophisticated way in which ruling elites with an authoritarian mentality 
exercise power in not fully democratic states50. Here the regimes do have a liberal democratic 
constitution, but instead of limiting the power of the state it is used for practical and authoritarian 
ideological functions to mask the idea of constitutionalism. But, as pointed out earlier, if the constitution 
does not limit the government’s power, it cannot fulfil the requirements of constitutionalism, and can 
 
 42  András Sajó and Renáta Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism, Oxford University 
Press, 2017. 13. 
 43  In contrast, others also regard other models of constitutionalism, in which the government, although committed to acting 
under a constitution, is not committed to pursuing liberal democratic values. See for instance Mark Tushnet, Varieties of 
Constitutionalism, 14 Int’l J. Const. L. 1 (2016). On 11 October 2019 Tushnet posted the following message to his Facebook 
page: “My lecture today was on "Varieties of Constitutionalism," and argued that a thin version of constitutionalism 
requires only (1) that there be some entrenched provisions, (2) that there be some mechanism for resolving disputes about 
what the law is that is oriented solely to making decision according to law, and (3) that the regime receive popular consent 
to the regime as a whole measured over some reasonable period of time. (Lots of complexities elided here.) The first 
subtext, which almost surfaced in the discussion afterwards, is that the Chinese leadership doesn't really have to fear 
constitutionalism as such (as it seems to do), if the very thin version I outlined counts as constitutionalism (which I think 
it does). The second subtext is that, if the idea of thin constitutionalism were accepted the way would be open for discussions 
about whether thin constitutionalism should be thickened (discussions that are harder to have if the idea of constitutionalism 
is ruled off the table fro the outset)”. Similarly, Gila Stopler defines the state of the current Israeli constitutional system as 
‘semi-liberal constitutionalism’. Cf. Gila Stopler, Constitutional Capture in Israel, ICONnect, August 21, 2017. 
 44  Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, 2014.  
 45  See for instance Alexander Somek, Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Austrian Constitutional Doctrine 1933-1938 and Its 
Legacy, in Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism Over Europe and Its legal 
Traditions (Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003); Turkuler Isiksel, Between Text and Context: Turkey’s 
Tradition of Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 11 Int’l J. Const. L. 702 (2013).  
 46  Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 13 Journal of Democracy 51 (2002). 
 47  Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 Cornell Law Review 391 (2015), 391-561.  
 48  Tushnet provides the following rough definition of authoritarianism: all decisions can potentially be made by a single 
decision maker (which might be a collective body), whose decisions are both formally and practically unregulated by law. 
Ibid., 448. 
 49  In the case of Singapore Tushnet argues that the government needs to preserve ethnic and religious hamony, without 
indicating why this goal can only be achieved by authoritarian tools. He mentions Malaysia, Mexico before 2000, Egypt 
under Mubarak, and Taiwan between 1955 and the late 1980s, and South Korea between 1948 and 1987 as candiates of 
authoritarian constitutionalism. See ibid., 393. 
 50  See Roberto Niembro Ortega, ‘Conceptualizing Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ), 
49 (2016), 339-367. 
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only be considered as sham constitution51, and as a rhetorical tool, just as populism is in the hands of 
autocrats. 
Most of the chapters in a recently published book52 – as the editors’ preface states – ‘challenge the notion 
of a single ‘proper sense’ of constitutionalism that is coexistensive with and exhausted by the discrete 
elements of the liberal paradigm’. In the introductory chapter, Günter Frankenberg argues that ‘liberal 
orthodoxy treats authoritarian constitutionalism not just as a contested concept, but as a mere travesty 
or deceitful rendition of the rules and principles, values and institutions of what is innocently referred 
to as ‘Western constitutionalism’’53. 
Referring to Roberto Gargarella’s book on Latin American constitutionalism54 Frankenberg claims that 
the orthodoxy gives ‘obsessive attention to issues of rights’, especially enforceable civil and political 
rights at the expense of redistributive policies or social entitlements, free and fair election, separation of 
powers, judicial review. He introduces authoritarian constitutionalism as ‘one of modernity’s narratives 
alloying rule and law,’ by using Machiavellian constitutional opportunistic technology, like Chinese 
head of state Xi Jinping observing established constitutional amendment procedure while stripping 
himself of the existing term limit, or more Hobbesian claim to defend the public good and people’s 
interest, like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán referring to European Christian values while 
denouncing human rights of refugees.55  
As Helena Alviar Garcia and Michael Wilkinson demonstrate in their contributions to the same book, 
political authoritarianism entertains an affinity with economic neoliberalism56. This can perfectly be 
proven by the neoliberal economic policy of the current authoritarian regime of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. 
One of the most tragic historical example of this relationship is the politics of the van Papen government 
in the last period of the Weimar Republic as clearly seen by Hermann Heller already in 193357. Heller 
claims that Papen wanted the state and the economy to be ‘strictly’ separated from one another. 
Legitimising this policy, Carl Schmitt in November 1932 lectured on ‘the state and economy,’ arguing 
that the total state makes an attempt to order the economy in an authoritarian way, drawing a sharp line 
of separation vis-á-vis the economy, although ruling on the other hand with the strongest military means 
and the means of mass manipulation (Radio, Cinema).58 Besides from retreating from economic and 
social policy, this authoritarian state is also supposed to retreat from socio-cultural policy. Heller 
concludes that this ‘authoritarian liberalism,’ which is characterised by the retreat of the authoritarian 
state from social policy, liberalization of the economy and dictatorial control by the state of politico-
intellectual functions cannot be ruled in democratic forms, proving the claim made earlier here that not 
only democracy presupposes liberalism, but there is no liberalism without democracy either. Together 
 
 51  About the concept of sham constitution see David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 863 
(2013). 
 52  Autoritarian Constituionalism. Comparative analysis and Critique (Helena Alviar Garcia and Günter Frankenberg eds., 
2019. 
 53  See Günter Frankenberg, Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Coming to Terms with Modernity’s Nightmares, in Autoritarian 
Constituionalism. Comparative analysis and Critique (Helena Alviar Garcia and Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019), 7. 
 54  Cf. Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution, Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 
 55  Günter Frankenberg, Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Coming to Terms with Modernity’s Nightmares, in Autoritarian 
Constituionalism. Comparative analysis and Critique (Helena Alviar Garcia and Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019), 13-17. 
 56  See Helena Alvoar Garcia, Neoliberalism As a Form of Auhoritarian Constitutionalism, , in Autoritarian Constituionalism. 
Comparative analysis and Critique (Helena Alviar Garcia and Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019), 37-56., and Michael A. 
Wilkinson, Authoritarian Liberalism As Authoritarian Constitutionalism, in Autoritarian Constituionalism. Comparative 
analysis and Critique (Helena Alviar Garcia and Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019), 317-337. 
 57  Cf. Heller’s paper on ‘Authortarian Liberalism?’, which orginally appeard in 1933in vol. 44 of Die Neue Rundschau (289-
298). See the English translated version in European Law Journal, Vol. 21. No. 3. May 2015. 295-301. 
 58  Ibid., 299-300. 
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with Juan José Linz we can also be skeptical regarding the efforts to distinguish between ostensibly 
benevolent ‘authoritarian, antidemocratic political solution’, and totalitarianism in the 1930s59. Based 
on the experiences of the current authoritarian regimes, for instance in Russia60 I would add the same 
doubts about the benevolence of ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ altogether. 
Besides the constitutions in the Communist countries, both current theocratic and communitarian 
constitutions are considered as illiberal.61 Theocratic constitutions, in contrast to modern 
constitutionalism, reject secular authority.62 In communitarian constitutions, like the ones in South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the well-being of the nation, the community and society receive utilitarian 
priority rather than the individual freedom, which is the principle of liberalism. But in these illiberal 
polities, there is no constitutionalism, their constitutions – using Pablo Castillo-Ortiz’s term - are ‘de-
normativised.’63 In other words, in my view ‘illiberal constitutionalism’ is an oxymoron.  
Can ‘Nonliberal Constitutionalism’ Be Really Constitutionalist? 
Besides illiberal constitutionalism there are also attempts to legitimate ‘nonliberal constitutionalism’ as 
a subtype of constitutionalism. Graham Walker uses the term for constitutionalist structures, ‘wherever 
people value some aspects of communal identity more than autonomy of individual choice.’64 Walker’s 
main example for the nonliberal, rather local than universal values is the multicultural grant of group 
right to native peoples and the distinct society of Québec, but he also mentions the state of Israel, which 
fails its noncitizen residents in many regrettable ways, as well as the tribal life of the native American 
nations in the US. The common characteristic of all these approaches is ‘to indict the notion of individual 
autonomy rights as a form of naïve and homogenizing universalism, and to unmask the ethnic and moral 
‘neutrality’ of the liberal state as a covert form of coercion.’65 Walker builds up his concept using Charles 
Howard McIlwain’s understanding of constitutionalism in his 1940 book66. According to McIlwain the 
limitation of government by law isn’t necessarily liberal, because the rights of individuals are nor 
centralized, and there is no need for a public authority to be a neutral arbiter among competing value 
systems. Among the more contemporary thinkers, Walker relies on Stanley Fish’s skepticism about 
individual rights of all kind. In his notorious articles from 198767 and 199268 respectively, Fish argues 
that because liberalism conceives its rational principles precisely as supranational and nonpartisan, ‘one 
can only conclude, and conclude nonparadoxically, that liberalism doesn’t exist.’ According to Walker, 
nonliberal constitutionalism historically was anticipated in some features of Republican Rome or of 
 
22 See Juan José Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner, 2000. 51. 
 60  Among the Machiavellian technologies Frankenberg mentions the Putin-Medvedev tandemocracy. Günter Frankenberg, 
Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Coming to Terms with Modernity’s Nightmares, in Autoritarian Constituionalism. 
Comparative analysis and Critique (Helena Alviar Garcia and Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019), 15. 
 61  Li-Ann Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 133 (Michel 
Rosenfeld, & András Sajó eds., 2012). Contrary to my understanding, Thio also talks about ’constitutionalism’ in illiberal 
polities.  
 62  There are two subcategories distinguished here: The Iranian subcategory, where Islam is granted an authoritative central 
role within the bounds of a constitution; and the Saudi Arabian subcategory, where Islam is present, without the formal 
authority of modern constitutionalism. 
 63  See Pablo Castillo-Ortiz, The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe, 15 European Constititonal Law Review, 
2019. 48-72, at 67. 
 64  Graham Walker, The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism, Nomos 
Vol. 39, Ethnicity and Group Rights, 1997. 154-184, at 155. 
 65  Ibid., 157. 
 66  Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, Cornell University Press, 1940.  
 67  Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn’t Exist, Duke Law Journal, December 1987. 
 68  Stranley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing, Too, Boston Review 17:1, 1992. 
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medieval Europe, or in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, while in more recent history in Canada 
before the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He also considers the evolving 
multiculturalist/tolerationist American university campus practices as an embryonic version of 
nonliberal constitutionalism, and ‘politically correct’ thinkers who promote such policies as hostile to 
the notion of ‘individual rights.’ 
The problem with Walker’s concept is that he conflates constitutionalism with the constitution. While 
the latter indeed predates the enlightenment, the former, together with liberalism does not69. The 
‘constitution’ as the configuration of public order defined by Aristotle or Cicero did not require the 
notion of individual rights, while modern constitutionalism does70. For instance Montesquieu in The 
Spirit of Laws argues that the constitutional system based on the separation of power is necessary for 
securing political liberty and preventing the emergence of ‘tyrannical laws’ and ‘execution of laws in a 
tyrannical manner.’71 This means that ‘fettered power’, which, according to Walker is the essence of 
constitutionalism, presupposes guaranteed individual rights. In other words, not only the anti- or illiberal 
version of constitutionalism, discussed earlier, but also the nonliberal one is an oxymoronic. 
Attempts to Legitimize ‘Illiberal Constitutionalism’ 
Majoritarian (Westminster) System 
Proponents of Fidesz’ illiberal constitution, as Béla Pokol, professor of law and member of the packed 
Hungarian Constitutional Court argues that the post-20122 constitutional system envisages the 
Westminster type of Parliamentary system, in which the ‘winner takes all’, and where principle of the 
unity of power prevails72. But the Hungarian or for that matter the Polish constitutional system cannot 
be considered as a monistic democracy, which just gives priority to democratic decision-making over 
fundamental rights.73 Actually, the new Hungarian constitution and the Polish constitutional practice do 
not comply with any models of government, which are based on the concept of separation of powers. 
The more traditional models of government forms are based on the relationship between the legislature 
and the executive. For instance, Arendt Lijphart differentiates between majoritarian (Westminster) and 
consensual models of democracy, the prototype of the first being the British, while of the second the 
continental European parliamentary, as well as the U.S. presidential system.74 Giovanni Sartori speaks 
about presidentialism and semi-presidentialism, as well as about two forms of parliamentarism, namely 
 
 69  ‘Classic liberalism’ in its 19th centrury European sense means individual liberty and free market. See András Sajó and Renáta 
Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, 2017. 13. 
 70  Carl J. Friedrich, one of the authors Walker refers to, in the later editions of his famous text on Constitutional Government 
and Democracy emhapsizes that the single function of constitutionalism is safeguarding each person in the exercise of 
‘individual rights.’ See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Governance and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and 
America, 4th ed., Blaisdell, 1968. 24, 7. Walter Murphy, another author, quoted by Walker after the democratic transition 
in Eastern Europe has also talked about ‘protecting individual liberty’ as the ultimate civic purpose of constitutionalism. 
Cf. Walter F- Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy, in Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie 
Beth Oliviero, and Steven D. Wheatley (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, 
Oxford University Press, 1993.  
 71  Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, (transl. and eds.AM Cohler, BC Miller, HS Stone, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Book XI. Chapter 6 at 157. (Quoted by Gábor Attila Tóth, Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism, Hague Journal on 
the Rule of Law, Published online: 10 September 2018.) 
 72  Béla Pokol, ‘Elismerés és kritika’ (Recognition and Criticism), Magyar Nemzet, 2011. március 24. 
 73  Bruce Ackerman distinguishes between three models of democracy: Monistic, rights fundamentalism, in which fundamental 
rights are morally prior to democratic decision-making and impose limits, and dualist, which finds the middle ground 
between these two extremes, and subjects majoritarian decision-making to constitutional guarantees. See Bruce Ackerman, 
1 We the People 6-16 (1992). 
 74  Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (1999). 
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the premiership system in the UK, or Kanzlerdemokratie in Germany, and the assembly government 
model in Italy.75 Bruce Ackerman uses, besides the Westminster and the US separation of powers 
systems, the constrained parliamentarism model as a new form of separation of powers, which has 
emerged against the export of the American system in favor of the model of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
India, Canada, South Africa, and other nations, where both popular referendums and constitutional 
courts constrain the power of the parliament.76  
Hungary and Poland, from 1990 until 2010, and 2015 respectively, belonged to the consensual and 
constrained parliamentary systems, close to the German Kanzlerdemokratie, in Poland with a more 
substantive role for the President of the Republic. But in Hungary, the 2011 Fundamental Law abolished 
almost all possibility of institutional consensus and constraints of the governmental power. In Poland, 
despite the fact that the governmental majority isn’t able to change the Constitution, due to the legislative 
efforts of the PiS government, the 1997 Constitution has become a sham document. In both countries, 
the system has moved towards an absolute parliamentary sovereignty model without the cultural 
constrains of the Westminster form of government. Not to mention the fact that in the last decades, the 
traditional British model of constitutionalism has also been changed drastically with the introduction of 
a bill of rights by left-of-centre governments—and opposed by right-of-centre opposition parties—in 
Canada (1982), New Zealand (1990), the United Kingdom (1998), the Australian Capital Territory 
(2004) and the State of Victoria (2006). Contrary to the traditional Commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism, in the new Commonwealth model the codified bills of rights became limits on the 
legislation, but the final word remained in the hands of the politically accountable branch of government. 
In this respect, this new Commonwealth model is different from the judicial supremacy approach of the 
US separation of powers model, as well from the European constrained parliamentary model. The 
biggest change occurred in the UK, and some even talk about the ‘demise of the Westminster model’.77 
The greatest deviation from the system of unlimited parliamentary sovereignty was the introduction of 
judicial review. In just over two decades, the number of applications for judicial review nearly 
quadrupled to over 3,400 in 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into effect in England and 
Wales.78 The Human Rights Act has a general requirement that all legislation should be compatible with 
the European Convention of Human Rights. This does not allow UK courts to strike down, or ‘disapply’, 
legislation, or to make new law. Instead, where legislation is deemed to be incompatible with 
Convention rights, superior courts may make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4.2. Then, 
the government and Parliament decide how to proceed. In this sense, the legislative sovereignty of the 
UK Parliament is preserved. Some academics argue that, although as a matter of constitutional legality 
Parliament may well be sovereign, as a matter of constitutional practice it has transferred significant 
power to the judiciary.79 
Others go even further and argue that, although the Human Rights Act 1998 is purported to reconcile 
the protection of human rights with the sovereignty of Parliament, it represents an unprecedented 
transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary.80  
Besides the mentioned Commonwealth countries, a similarly new model has emerged in Israel, where 
the Basic Law on occupation, re-enacted in 1994, contains a ‘notwithstanding’ provision, similar to the 
Canadian one. The new model of Commonwealth constitutionalism is based on a dialogue between the 
 
 75  Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (2nd ed., 1997). 
 76  Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000). 
 77  Cf. Philip Norton, Governing Alone, Parliamentary Affairs, October 2003, 544. 
 78  See David Judge, Whatever Happened to Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom, Parliamentary Affairs, July 
2004, 691. 
 79  Cf. Keith D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 Modern L. Rev. 79, 92 (1999).  
 80  See Matthew Flinders, Shifting the Balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution, Political Studies, March 
2002, 62.  
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judiciary and the parliament. In contrast to these new trends, in the Hungarian and Polish constitutional 
system the parliamentary majority not only decides every single issue without any dialogue, but 
practically there is no partner for such a dialogue, due to the fact that the independence of both the 
ordinary judiciary and the constitutional courts have been eliminated.  
Political Constitutionalism 
It is striking, and of significance, how the illiberal authoritarians in Central and Eastern Europe attempt 
to legitimize their actions by referring to political constitutionalism as their approach to constitutional 
change. The main argument of Central and Eastern European illiberals to defend their constitutional 
projects is grounded in a claim to political constitutionalism, which favors parliamentary rule and weak 
judicial review. To be clear, despite some academics’ efforts to apply the concept of political 
constitutionalism in defense of illiberalism, I do not consider political constitutionalism, based on 
republican philosophy, or all of the concepts rejecting strong judicial review, or judicial review 
altogether, as populist.81 Some scholars and constitutional court justices both in Hungary and Poland 
have attempted to interpret the new constitutional system as a change from legal to political 
constitutionalism. In my view, these interpretations are simply efforts to legitimize the silencing of 
judicial review.  
One of the ‘fake judges’ of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the late Lech Morawski, emphasized the 
republican traditions, present both in Hungary and Poland, mentioning the names of Michael Sandel, 
Philip Pettit, and Quentin Skinner.82 Also, constitutional law professor Adam Czarnota explained the 
necessity of the changes, with the argument that ‘legal constitutionalism alienated the constitution from 
citizens…The place of excluded citizens was taken by lawyers.’83 He proudly acknowledges that the 
governing party, PiS has appointed judges that represent its worldview, which according to Czarnota is 
based ‘on the principle of supremacy of the Parliament in relation to constitutional review and 
acceptance of a role of the judicial restraint not judicial activism which was earlier the norm.’84 Czarnota 
interprets the present constitutional crisis in Poland and in some other countries in Central-Eastern 
Europe as ‘an attempt to take the constitution seriously and return it to the citizens,’85 what he considers 
the fulfillment of political constitutionalism.  
In Hungary, István Stumpf, constitutional judge, nominated without any consultation with opposition 
parties by FIDESZ right after the new government took over in 2010, and elected exclusively with the 
votes of the governing parties’ votes, in his book argued for a strong state and claimed the expansion of 
political constitutionalism regarding the changes.86 It is remarkable that two other members of the 
current packed Constitutional Court also argue against legal constitutionalism, blaming it as ‘judicial 
dictatorship’87 or ‘juristocractic.’88 In the scholarly literature, Attila Vincze argued that the decision of 
the Constitutional Court accepting the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law—which among 
other things also invalidated the entire case-law of the Court prior to the new constitution—was a sign 
 
 81  See for the opposite view Lucia Corso, What Does Populism Have to Do with Constitutional Law? Discussing Populist 
Constitutionalism and Its Assumptions, Rivista di filosofia del Diritto 443 (2014). 
 82  Lech Morawski, A Critical Response, Verfassungsblog, June 3, 2017. 
 83  Adam Czarnota, The Constitutional Tribunal, Verfassungsblog, June 3, 2017. 
 84  Ibid. 
 85  Ibid. 
 86  See István Stumpf, Erős Állam – Alkotmányos Korlátok [Strong State – Constitutional Limits] 244-249 (2014).  
 87  See András. Zs. Varga, From Ideal to Idol? The Concept of the Rule of Law, Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. 16.  
 88  Béla Pokol, The Juristocratic State: Its Victory and the Possibility of Taming. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2017. 
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of political constitutionalism prevailing over the legal one.89 Even those, like Kálmán Pócza, Gábor 
Dobos and Attila Gyulai who acknowledge that the Court hasn’t been confrontational towards the 
current legislature and the government characterize this behavior as a special approach within the system 
of separation of powers, best described as a partnership in a constitutional dialogue90. 
Political constitutionalists, like Richard Bellamy, Jeremy Waldron, Akhil Amar, Sandy Levinson, and 
Mark Tushnet, who themselves differ from one another significantly, emphasize the role of elected 
bodies instead of courts in implementing and protecting the constitution, but none of them reject the 
main principles of constitutional democracy, as ‘illiberal’ populist constitutionalists do. Even Richard 
D. Parker, who announced a ‘constitutional populist manifesto’ wanted only to challenge the basic idea, 
central to constitutional law, ‘that constitutional constraints on public power in a democracy are meant 
to contain or tame the exertion of popular political energy rather than to nurture, galvanize, and release 
it.’91 Similarly, those who describe a new model of constitutionalism, based on deliberation between 
courts and the legislator, with the latter retaining the final word, have nothing to do with illiberal 
constitutionalism.92 Those scholars realize that parliamentary sovereignty tends to be increasingly 
restrained, either legally or politically, and that the last decades have witnessed less and less scope for 
the exercise of traditional pouvoir constituant, conceived as the unrestrained ‘will of the people’, even 
in cases of regime change or the establishment of substantially and formally new constitutional 
arrangements.93 The remainders of both Hungarian and Polish constitutional review have nothing to do 
with any types of political constitutionalism or a weak judicial review approach, which all represent a 
different model of separation of powers. In the authoritarian Hungarian and in the Polish sham system 
of constitutionalism, there is no place for any kind of separation of powers. 
Following Tamás Györfi’s theory, there are three different forms of weak judicial review: each of them 
is lacking one of the defining features of strong constitutional review, but all of them want to strike a 
 
 89  Attila Vincze, Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata az Alaptörvény negyedik módosításáról: az alkotmánymódosítás 
alkotmánybírósági kontrollja [The Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental 
Law: The Constitutional Review of Constitutional Amendments], Jogesetek Magyarázata 3, 12 (2013). 
 90  See K. Pócza – G. Dobos – A. Gyulai, ‘The Hungarian Constitutional Court: A constructive partner in constitutional 
dialogue’, in K. Pócza (ed.), Constitutional Politics and the Judiciary. Decision-Making in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Routledge, 2018. Chapter 5.  
 91  Analyzing Thomas Mann’s novel Mario and the Magician, written in 1929, Parker draws the conclusion for today that, “the 
point is to get out and take part in politics ourselves, not looking down from a ‘higher’ pedestal, but on the same level with 
all of the other ordinary people.” Richard D. Parker, ‘Here, the People Rule': A Constitutional Populist Manifesto, 27 
Valparaiso Univ. L. Rev. 583, 531-584 (1993). A similar message can be detected in the interview with Mark Lilla, a 
conservative liberal professor of the humanities at Columbia University, who on the day after Donald Trump’s presidential 
victory declared: “One of the many lessons of the recent presidential election and its repugnant outcome is that the age of 
identity liberalism must be brought to an end.” Mark Lilla, The End of Identity Liberalism. The New York Times, 
November 18, 2016. Later, in an interview on the topic of the most effective tools against the President’s populism, Lilla 
emphasized the importance that opponents find a way to unify: “We have to abandon the rhetoric of difference, in order to 
appeal to what we share.” David Remnick, A Conversation with Mark Lilla on His Critique of Identity Politics, The New 
Yorker, Aug. 25, 2017. 
 92  See Stephen Gardbaum, The Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism. Theory and Practice (2013) about the new model. 
This model has also come to be known by several other names: “weak-form of judicial review” (Mark Tushnet, Alternative 
Forms of Judicial Review, 101 Michigan L. Rev. 2781 (2003)); “weak judicial review” (Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L. J. 1348 (2006)); “the parliamentary bill of rights model” (Janet Hiebert, 
Parliamentary Bill of Rights. An Alternative Model?, 69 Modern L. Rev. 7 (2006)); “the model of democratic dialogue” 
(Alison L. Young, Parliamentrary Sovereignty And The Human Rights Act (2009)); “dialogic judicial review” (Kent 
Roach, Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics, 23 Supreme Court Law Review, 2nd series 49 (2004)); “collaborative 
constitution” (Aileen Kavanaugh, Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron, 22 Law and Philosophy 
451 (2003)); or “democratic constitutionalism” (Robert Post – Reva Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, White Paper, 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/white-pages/democratic-constitutionalism)). 
 93  Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Change’, in How Constitutions Change – A Comparative 
Study (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011). 
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balance between democracy and the protection of human rights that differs from the balance struck by 
the ‘new constitutionalism’ of strong judicial review.94 First, judicial review is limited if the constitution 
lacks a bill of rights, as is the case in Australia. Second, judicial review is deferential if courts usually 
defer to the views of the elected branches, as in the Scandinavian constitutional systems, or are even 
constitutionally obliged to do so, as in Sweden and Finland. Finally, and probably most importantly, 
there is the Commonwealth model of judicial review, where courts are authorized to review legislation, 
but the legislature has the possibility to override or disregard judicial decisions.95 
In my view, neither the Polish nor the Hungarian model fits any of these approaches to weak judicial 
review, as their aim is neither to balance democracy nor the protection of fundamental rights. The 
weakening of the power of constitutional courts has started in Hungary right after the landslide victory 
of the center-right FIDESZ party in the 2010 parliamentary elections. What happened in Hungary 
resonated with some less successful, similar attempts to weaken constitutional review in other East-
Central European countries that took place roughly around the same time. In the Summer of 2012, there 
was a constitutional crisis also in Romania, where the ruling socialists tried to dismantle both the 
constitutional court and the president, but the EU was able to exert a stronger influence over events 
there.96 From 2014, there has also been a constitutional crisis in progress in Slovakia, where the 
Constitutional Court has also worked with two—and from February 2016 three—judges short, because 
the President of the Republic refused to fill the vacancies.97 But the most successful follower of the 
Hungarian playbook on how to dismantle constitutional review has been Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s 
governing party (PiS) and its government in Poland. After the 2015 parliamentary election in Poland, 
the Law and Justice Party (PiS) also followed the playbook of Viktor Orbán, and started by first 
capturing the Constitutional Tribunal.98 But these efforts have nothing to do with political 
constitutionalism, partly because they do not question the capacity of constitutional courts to invalidate 
legislation passed by parliaments, partly because they are not based on the mechanism of political 
accountability and checks on power.99 Also, political constitutionalism emphasises the importance of 
legislatures over courts, and not the direct role of citizens, as Czarnota argues. This dismantlement of 
constitutional review cannot be considered as a par excellence majoritarian project either.100 
Constitutional Identity 
From the very beginning, the government of Viktor Orbán has justified non-compliance with the 
principles of liberal democratic constitutionalism enshrined also in Article 2 of the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU) by referring to national sovereignty.101 Lately, as an immediate reaction to the 
 
 94  See Tamás. Györfi, Against The New Constitutionalism (2016). 
 95  See Gardbaum, supra note 62.  
 96  About the Romanian crisis see Vlad Perju, The Romanian double executive and the 2012 constitutional crisis, 13 Int’l J. of 
Constitutional L. 246–278 (2015); Bogdan Iancu, Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law in Romania: The Crisis in 
Concepts and Contexts, in Constitutional Crisis In The European Constitutional Area 153 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál 
Sonnevend eds., 2015). 
 97  Tomás Lálik, Constitutional Crisis in Slovakia: Still Far from Resolution, ICONect, August 5, 2016. 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/08/constitutional-court-crisis-in-slovakia-still-far-away-from-resolution/. 
 98  The same playbook was also used outside the region, in Turkey by Erdoğan and in Venezuela by Chavez.  
 99  See this requirements of political constitutionalism in Pablo Castillo-Ortiz, The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in 
Europe, 15 European Constititonal Law Review, 2019. 48-72, at 64. 
 100  As Wojciech Sadurski rightly points out the Polish governing party, PiS obtained 18% of the votes of all eligible voters. 
See Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown, Oxford Univesity Press, 2019. 1. 
 101  The first reaction of the Hungarian government to the so called ‘Tavares report’ of 3 July 2013 of the European Parliament 
on the Hungarian constitutional situation (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-
2013-0229&language=EN) was not a sign of willingness to comply with the recommendations of the report, but rather a 
harsh rejection. Two days after the European Parliament adopted the report at its plenary session, the Hungarian Parliament 
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EU’s efforts to solve the refugee crisis, the government has advanced the argument that the country’s 
constitutional identity is guaranteed in Article 4 (2) TEU.  
After some draconian legislative measures were adopted, the government started a campaign against the 
EU’s plan to relocate refugees. The first step was a referendum initiated by the government. On 2 
October 2016, Hungarian voters went to the polls to answer one referendum question: ‘Do you want to 
allow the European Union to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the 
approval of the National Assembly?’ Although 92 % of those who casted votes and 98 % of all the valid 
votes agreed with the government, answering ‘no’ (6 % were spoiled ballots), the referendum was 
invalid because the turnout was only around 40 %, instead of the required 50 %.  
As a next attempt, Prime Minister Orbán introduced the Seventh Amendment, which would have made 
it ‘the responsibility of every state institution to defend Hungary’s constitutional identity’. The most 
important provision of the draft amendment reads: ‘No foreign population can settle in Hungary’. Since 
the governing coalition lost its two-thirds majority, even though all of its MPs voted in favour of the 
proposed amendment, it fell two votes short of the required majority. After this second failure, the 
Constitutional Court, loyal to the government, came to the rescue of Orbán’s constitutional identity 
defence of its policies on migration. The Court revived a petition of the also loyal Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights, filed a year earlier, before the referendum was initiated. In his motion, the 
Commissioner asked the Court to deliver an abstract interpretation of the Fundamental Law in 
connection with the Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015.  
The Constitutional Court in its decision held that ‘the constitutional self-identity of Hungary is a 
fundamental value not created by the Fundamental Law – it is merely acknowledged by the Fundamental 
Law, consequently constitutional identity cannot be waived by way of an international treaty’.102 
Therefore, the Court argued, ‘the protection of the constitutional identity shall remain the duty of the 
Constitutional Court as long as Hungary is a sovereign State’.103 This abuse of constitutional identity 
aimed at not taking part in the joint European solution to the refugee crisis is an exercise of national 
constitutional parochialism,104 which attempts to abandon the common European liberal democratic 
constitutional whole.  
 
adopted Resolution 69/2013 on ‘the equal treatment due to Hungary’. The document is written in first person plural as an 
anti-European manifesto on behalf of all Hungarians: ‘We, Hungarians, do not want a Europe any longer where freedom 
is limited and not widened. We do not want a Europe any longer where the Greater abuses his power, where national 
sovereignty is violated and where the Smaller has to respect the Greater. We have had enough of dictatorship after 40 years 
behind the iron curtain.’ The resolution argues that the European Parliament exceeded its jurisdiction by passing the report, 
and creating institutions that violate Hungary's sovereignty as guaranteed in the Treaty on the European Union. The 
Hungarian text also points out that behind this abuse of power there are business interests, which were violated by the 
Hungarian government by reducing the costs of energy paid by families, which could undermine the interest of many 
European companies which for years have gained extra profits from their monopoly in Hungary. In its conclusion, the 
Hungarian Parliament called on the Hungarian government ‘not to cede to the pressure of the European Union, not to let 
the nation's rights guaranteed in the fundamental treaty be violated, and to continue the politics of improving life for 
Hungarian families’. These words very much reflect the Orbán government’s view of ‘national freedom’, which emphasizes 
the liberty of the state (or the nation) to determine its own laws: ‘This is why we are writing our own constitution…And 
we don’t want any unsolicited help from strangers who are keen to guide us…Hungary must turn on its own axis’. (For the 
original, Hungarian-language text of Orbán’s speech, entitled Nem leszünk gyarmat! [We won’t be a colony anymore!] see 
e.g. <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/nem_leszunk_gyarmat_The English-language translation of excerpts from 
Orbán’s speech was made available by Hungarian officials, see e.g. Financial Times: Brussels Blog, 16 March 2012, at: 
<http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2012/03/the-eu-soviet-barroso-takes-on-hungarys-
orban/?catid=147&SID=google#axzz1qDsigFtC>). 
 102  Decision 22/2016 AB of the Constitutional Court of Hungary [67]. See a detailed analysis of the decision G. Halmai, ‘Abuse 
of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law, 
Review of Central and East European Law, 43 (2018), 23-42. 
 103  Ibid.  
 104  See the term used by M. Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On Structure and Limits of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, in M. Avbelj and J. Komárek, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Hart, 2012. 51. 
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The Constitutional Court in its decision 3/2019. (III. 7.) AB also decided about the constitutionality of 
certain elements of the Stop Soros legislative package, and ruled that the criminalization of ’facilitating 
illegal immigration’ does not violate the Fundamental Law. The Court again referred to the 
constitutional requirement to protect Hungary’s sovereignty and constitutional identity to justify this 
clear violation of freedom of association, freedom of expression hiding behind the alleged obligation to 
protect Schengen borders against ’masses entering uncontrollably and illegitimately’ the EU105. Besides 
infringing the rights of the NGOs, the decision deprives all asylum seekers of the protection of all 
fundamental rights by stating that „the fundamental rights protection … clearly does not cover the 
persons arrived in the territory of Hungary through any country where he or she had not been persecuted 
or directly threatened with persecution. Therefore, the requirements set forth by Article I Paragraph (3) 
of the Fundamental Law regarding the restriction of fundamental rights shall not be applied to the 
regulation of the above listed cases’106. With this the Court denies the core of human dignity: the right 
to have rights.  
Illiberal Societies  
Social Relations  
Historically, in the East-Central European countries there were only some unexpected moments of quick 
flourishing of liberalism and liberal democracy followed by an equally quick delegitimization of it. For 
instance shortly after 1945, till the communist parties took over, and also after 1989, when liberal 
democracy again seemed to be the ‘end of history’.107 Otherwise, in the national history of the Central 
and Eastern European countries’ authoritarianism, such as the pre-1939 authoritarian Hungarian or 
Polish politics, played a much more important role in the transformation.108 Maybe the only exception 
was the independent Czechoslovakia established after WWI, led by its first President Tomáš Garrigue 
Masaryk109.  
As mentioned earlier, modernization is the main enemy of illiberal theory. As surveys on the links 
between modernization and democracy show, the society’s historic and religious heritage leaves a 
lasting imprint.110 According to these surveys, the public of formerly agrarian societies, like many of the 
East Central European ones emphasize religion, national pride, obedience, and respect for authority, 
while the publics of industrial societies emphasize secularism, cosmopolitanism, autonomy, and 
rationality.111 Even modernization’s changes are not irreversible: economic collapse can reverse them, 
 
 105  Para [43] of 3/2019. (III. 7.) AB. 
 106  Ibid. [49]. 
 107  See the results of the research project “Negotiating Modernity”: History of Modern Political Thought in East-Central 
Europe, led by Balázs Trencsényi, and supported by the European Research Council, https://erc.europa.eu/“negotiating-
modernity”-history-modern-political-thought-east-central-europe 
 108  See Slomo Avineri, Two Decades After the Fall: Between Utopian Hopes and the Burdens of History, Dissent, 30 
September 2009. 
 109  When the preamble of the 1992 Czech constitution incorporated the principle of a civic nation “in the spirit of the inviolable 
values of human dignity and freedom as the home of equal and free citizens”, it was a hint to Masaryk’s belief in the 
universal validity and critical power of democracy and liberty elaborated in his study on The Czech Question. See J. Přibáň, 
The Defence of Constitutionalism. The Czech Question in Post-national Europe, and Karolinum Press, Charles University, 
2017. 115-116. 
 110  See R. Inglehart & C. Welzel, ‘Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy’, Perspectives 
on Politics, 2010, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 551-567. 
 111  Id., p. 553. This is one of the reason of Czechia’s less religious society. Christian Welzel in his more recent book argues 
that fading existential pressures open people's minds, making them prioritize freedom over security, autonomy over 
authority, diversity over uniformity and creativity over discipline, tolerance and solidarity over discrimination and hostility 
against out-groups. On the other hand, persistent existential pressures keep people's mind closed, in which case they 
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as happened during the early 1990s in most former communist states. These findings were confirmed 
by another international comparative study conducted by researchers of Jacobs University in Bremen 
and published by the German Bertelsmann Foundation.112 According to the study, which examined 34 
countries in the EU and the OECD, countries in East Central Europe have had a low level of social 
cohesion ever since the postcommunist transformation, Hungary is ranked at 27th, between Poland and 
Slovakia. Social cohesion is defined as the special quality with which members of a community live and 
work together. Even though the transition to democracy in East Central Europe was driven by the fact 
that a large share of the population gave high priority to freedom itself, but people expected the new 
states to produce speedy economic growth, with which the country could attain the living standards of 
West preferably overnight, without painful reforms113. In other words, one can argue that the average 
people in these countries pursued the West in 1989-1990, though not so much in terms of the Western 
political and constitutional system, but rather in terms of the living standards of the West. Claus Offe 
predicted the possible backsliding effect of the economic changes and decline in living standards, saying 
that this could undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and turn back the process of 
democratization.114 This failure, together with the emergence of an economically and politically 
independent bourgeoisie, the accumulation of wealth by some former members of the communist 
nomenclature, unresolved issues in dealing with the communist past, the lack of retributive justice 
against perpetrators of grave human rights violations, and a mild vetting procedure and lack of restitution 
of the confiscated properties, were reasons for disappointment. Again, Czechia has been different both 
regarding the bourgeoisie and the harsher transitional justice measures. 
Trying to explain the attitudes of voters to support authoritarian pursuit of illiberal leaders, such as Orbán 
or Kaczyński, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris suggests that it would be a mistake to attribute the rise 
of authoritarian populism directly to economic inequality alone, as psychological factors seem to play 
an even more important role. Older and less-educated people tend to support populist parties and leaders 
that defend traditional cultural values and emphasize nationalistic and xenophobia appeals, rejecting 
outsiders, and upholding old-fashioned gender roles.115 Similarly, Will Wilkinson argues that 
urbanisation is a process that divides society in cultural values. While it creates thriving, multicultural, 
high-density areas where socially liberal values predominate, it also leaves behind rural areas and 
smaller urban centres that are increasingly uniform in terms of rather illiberal values.116 
Interestingly enough a more recent research of Christian Welzel and Plamen Akaliyski have a slightly 
different evaluation about the cultural values of East-Central European countries after the democratic 
transition, questioning, whether the cultural walls still stands between East and West of the former Iron 
Curtain117. They claim that countries that joined the European Union have converged significantly 
towards the cultural model of the core of EU member states., while European countries that remained 
outside the EU have shifted their cultural values away from this EU core.  
 
emphasize the opposite priorities. This is the utility ladder of freedom. Ch. Welzel, Freedom Rising. Human Empowerment 
and the Quest for Emancipation, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 112  D. Schiefer, J. van der Noll, J. Delhey, & K. Boehnke, Cohesion Radar: Measuring Cohesiveness, Bertelsmann Foundation, 
2013, <www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_36378__2.pdf> 
 113  As Ulrich Preuss argues, the satisfaction of the basic economic needs of the populace was so important for both the ordinary 
people and the new political elites that constitutions did not really make a difference. See U. K. Preuss, Constitutional 
Revolution. The Link Between Constitutionalism and Progress. Humanities Press. 1993, 3. 
 114  Cf. C. Offe, Designing Institutions for East European Transitions, Institut für Höhere Studies, 1994. 15. 
 115  R. Inglehart and P. Norris, Culktural Backlash, Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, Cambridge University Press, 
2019.  
 116  W. Wilkinson, The Density Divide: Urbanization, Polarization, and Populist Backlash, Research Paper of the Niskanen 
Center, June 2018. 
 117  Plamen Akaliyski and Christian Welzel, ‘Clashing Values: Cultural and Geoplolitical Transformation of Post-Cold War 
Europe’, World Values Research, Volume 11/Number 4/2019. 85-123.  
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A recent Eurobarometer survey conducted in April 2019 proved the observation of Akaliyski and Welzel 
even in the case of Hungary and Poland, the most illiberal EU member states, at least regarding values 
related to the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. People in these countries acknowledge 
both the importance of independent constitutional institutions, including judicial review and court, as 
well as that all state institutions respect court rulings, and the need for improvement on these fields. 
When asked about the importance of ‘that all member states respect the core values of the EU, including 
fundamental rights, the rule of law, and democracy’ 31% of Poles found this essential, 53% important, 
in Hungary the same figures were 55 and 37% respectively, which is even higher than the average of 
the 28 EU member states (53 and 36% respectively). Whether certain elements of these, for instance ‘if 
your rights are not respected, you can have them upheld by an independent court’ need to be improved 
32 and 44% of the Poles, while the 54 and 35% of Hungarians (again above the EU average of 50 and 
30%) said it definitely or somewhat can.118  
This relatively high awareness of the importance and the need of improvement of values such 
fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy is hardly reconcilable with the continuous support – 
especially in the rural areas, mentioned by Will Wilkinson - of the authoritarian governments of Hungary 
and Poland, which openly defy these values.119 Here I cannot even try to fully explain all the possible 
reasons of this discrepancy. In Hungary one of them is certainly due to the lack of the independent 
media, and the freedom of civil society organisations people, even though admitting the necessity of 
improvement in complying with European values people do not necessarily recognise the autocratic 
pursuits of the government. Morover, in Poland neither the media nor civil society organisation have yet 
been dismantled. Here, the main reason of the support of the authoritarian government may lie in the 
very popular social benefits. In 2016 the PiS government introduced a child benefits programme called 
‘500+’: all parents get 500 Polish zloty (about 115 Euros) per month per child, from the second child 
on. Low-income families got it from the first child. In early 2019, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the leader of PiS 
announced another set of social benefits: a monthly 500 zloty for each child, the increase of pension 
benefits and tax levies for persons under 26 years of age120. 
 
118http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/special/surveyky/2235. 
Here are some other some other data on the importance and need of improvement of certain rule of law issues. 1. When 
asked about the importance of having independent controls ensuring that laws can be challenged and tested, 28% of the 
Polish and 55% of the Hungarian people believe it essential and 57 and 36% respectively important (the average results for 
the whole EU are 49% and 41% respectively). When asked whether this particular issue can be improved 26% of the Polish 
and 50% of the Hungarian respondents replied that it definitely can and 48 and 36% respectively said it somewhat can (the 
average results for the whole EU are 49% and 33% respectively). 2. 41% of the Polish and 61% of the Hungarian 
respondents believe it essential, and 49 and 32% respectively important that judges are independent and not under the 
influence of politicians or economic interests (the average results for the whole EU are 65% and 29% respectively). 
Whereas 35% of the Poles and 54 % of the Hungarians assert that it’s definitely essential that this issue should be improved, 
45 and 35% respectively thereof believe that it is somewhat important that this should be improved (the average results for 
the whole EU are 51% and 31% respectively). 3. When it comes to assessing the importance of public authorities and 
politicians respecting and applying court rulings, 39% of the Polish and 59% of the Hungarian people deem it essential 
whilst 52 and 33% respectively important (the average results for the whole EU are 60% and 34% respectively). 34% of 
the Polish and 52 % of the Hungarian respondents indicated that it can definitely and 44 and 37% respectively that it can 
somewhat be improved. 
 119  According to Politico’s Poll of Polls polling projection, the support of PiS, the Polish governing party was at 47% on 25 
September 2019 (https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/poland/), while that of Fidesz, the Hungarian ruling party at 
53% in 15 September 2019 https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/hungary/. 
 120  See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-childbenefits/child-benefits-and-tax-breaks-as-polish-government-
gears-up-for-election-idUSKCN1TS24G 
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Economic Relations  
Paradoxically, politically illiberal leaders, like Viktor Orbán of Hungary use (neo)liberal economic 
policy to support their autocratic (constitutional) agenda121. As many argue refering to Karl Polányi’s 
influencial book, The Great Repression the resistance to social democracy through authoritarianism in 
the name of economic liberalism prepared the ground for Fascism, and can lead to autocracy again122. 
While other, mostly left-wing populists react to the unfulfilled promise of social-rights 
constitutionalism, based on T.H. Marshall’s concept of social rights being continuous to civil and 
political rights, which turned out to be a lie in most of East Central European countries’ constitutional 
practice.123 As Samuel Moyn argues, a commitment to material equality disappeared, in its place market 
fundamentalism has emerged as the dominant force of national and global economics124.  
The new illiberal system of ‘national cooperation’ in Hungary has left behind the vulnerable members 
of society, homeless people and refugees, and tries to diminish or cut the solidary actions of the members 
of the Hungarian society. In this respect Orbán’s right-wing authoritarian populism even differs from 
the policy of other right-wing populists, such as the French National Front or Austria’s Freedom Party, 
who – similarly to Orbán - mobilize their supporters with exclusion through immigration policy, but as 
opposed to the Hungarian PM, they often also emphasize inclusion through social rights and economic 
security125.  
The packed Hungarian Constitutional Court rubberstamps the government’s neoliberal economic policy, 
changing its predecessor’s practice, which in the mid 1990’s was willing to strike down austerity 
measures for the protection of social rights closely tying them to the protection of equal human dignity. 
Although social solidarity was an underdeveloped societal practice from the beginning of the democratic 
transition for several reasons, the that time Constitutional Court strongly committed itself to the 
protection of human dignity and this way guaranteed a higher profile for social (solidarity) rights, 
especially in case of social care based on neediness.  
Then, as a contrast, in the ‘non-solidary’ system of the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 social 
security does not appear as a fundamental right, but merely as something the state ‘shall strive’ for, 
which is a step backward in comparison with the 1989 Constitution. Social insurance is not a 
constitutional institution any more, and the provisions of the Fundamental Law do not guarantee equal 
dignity and the former level of property protection. The recent case law of the Constitutional Court 
 
 121  This phenomena is called by Michael Wilkinson as authoritarian liberalism. See M. A. Wilkinson, ‘Authoritarian 
Liberalism aa Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, in H. Alviar and G. Frankenberg (eds.), Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 
Edward Elgar, 2019.  
 122  See Wilkinson, ibid, and also B. Bugaric, ’ The Two Faces of Populism: 
Between Authoritarian and Democratic Populism’, 20 German Law Journal, No. 3. 2019.  
 123  Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, analysing the normative theory of left populist, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
respectively go even further by claiming that left populism also cannot avoid the authoritarianism inherent in the strategy 
and logic of populism despite the inclusionary and democratizing projects of the left movements it attaches to and despite 
the democratic socialist rhetoric of left populist leaders and their organic intellectuals. See Andrew Arato, ‘Political 
Theology and Populism’, Social Research, Vol. 80: No. 1. Spring 2013., as well as Andrew Arato, ‘Socialism and 
Populism,’ Constellations, 2019: 26., and Jean L. Cohen, ‘What’s Wrong with the Normative Theory (and the Actual 
Preactice) of Left Populism?’, Constellations, 2019: 26. In my view it is certainly true for Latin Amarican populist from 
Peron through Morales, Correa, till Chavez and Maduro, but not necessarily for European left populist parties, such as 
Podemes, Five Star and Syriza. The last two did not even show serious authoritarian pursuits while being in power. One of 
the proofs provided by Andrew Arato himself in a paper, in which he discusses how populist governments dismantle 
constitutional courts. None of the European left populist governments are subject of the comaparison. See. Andrew Arato, 
‘Populism, Constitutional Courts and Civil Society’, in Christine Langfried (ed.), Judicial Power: How Constitutional 
Courts Affect Political Transformations, Cambridge University Press, 2019. 318-341.  
 124  S. Moyn, Not Enough. Human Rights in an Unequal World, Harvard University press, 2018.  
 125  See A. Weale, The Will of the People. A Modern Myth, Polity, 2018. 40-42. 
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reaffirms the initial concerns, the dignity supported social solidarity got lost in the illiberal backsliding 
of the past ten years. 
Political Relations 
The expansion of political illiberalism in East Central Europe through the introduction of a new illiberal 
constitutional regime went the furthest in Hungary and Poland. In the case of the former through a brand-
new constitution enacted in 2010, or through legislative changes that ignore the valid liberal constitution, 
as is the case in Poland since 2015. Ironically, both countries are still members of the European Union, 
a value community based on the principles of liberal democracy.  
Hungary 
The new constitution, entitled the Fundamental Law of Hungary was passed by the Parliament on 18 
April 2011.126 The drafting of the Fundamental Law took place without following any of the elementary 
political, professional, scientific and social debates. These requirements stem from the applicable 
constitutional norms and those rules of the House of Parliament that one would expect to be met in a 
debate concerning a document that will define the life of the country over the long term. The debate, 
which lasted for nine days — effectively— took place with the sole and exclusive participation of 
representatives of the governing political parties.127  
Here I address some of those flaws in its content in relation to which the suspicion arises that they may 
permit exceptions to the European requirements of democracy, constitutionalism and the protection of 
fundamental rights, and, thus, that in the course of their application they could conflict with Hungary’s 
international obligations. 
1. Government without checks128. The new constitution appears to still contain the key features of 
constitutional constraint imposed by checked and balanced powers. But those constraints are largely 
illusory, because key veto points have been abolished or seriously weakened. Appointments to key 
offices, like Constitutional Court judgeships, ombudsmen, the head of the State Audit Office and the 
public prosecutor, no longer require minority party input. Independent boards regulating crucial 
institutions necessary for democracy, like the election commission and the media board, no longer 
ensure multiparty representation. The Constitutional Court itself has been packed and weakened because 
its jurisdiction has been limited. The constitutional reforms have seriously undermined the independence 
of the ordinary judiciary through changing the appointment and oversight rules of judges.  
2. Identity of the political community. An important criterion for a democratic constitution is that 
everybody living under it can regard it as his or her own. The Fundamental Law breaches this 
requirement on multiple counts.  
a) Its lengthy preamble, entitled National Avowal, defines the subjects of the constitution not as the 
totality of people living under the Hungarian laws, but as the Hungarian ethnic nation: ‘We, the members 
of the Hungarian Nation ... hereby proclaim the following’. A few paragraphs down, the Hungarian 
 
 126  For the ‘official’ English translation of the Fundamental Law, see: http://www.kormany.hu/download/7/99/30000 
/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf 
 127  In its opinion approved at its plenary session of 17-18 June 2011, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission also 
expressed its concerns related to the document, which was drawn up in a process that excluded the political opposition and 
professional and other civil organisations. See: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL-AD(2011)016-E.pdf. Fidesz’s 
counter-argument was that the other Parliamentary parties excluded themselves from the decision-making process with 
their boycott, with the exception of Jobbik, which voted against the document. 
 128  See a more detailed analysis on the lack of checks and balances in M. Bánkuti & G. Halmai & K. L. Scheppele,’From 
Separation of Powers to a Government without Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions’, in G. A. Tóth (Ed.), 
Constitution for a Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, CEU Press, 2012.  
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nation returns as ‘our nation torn apart in the storms of the last century’. The Fundamental Law defines 
it as a community, the binding fabric of which is ‘intellectual and spiritual’: not political, but cultural. 
There is no place in this community for the nationalities living within the territory of the Hungarian 
state. At the same time, there is a place in it for the Hungarians living beyond the borders. 
The elevation of the ‘single Hungarian nation’ to the status of constitutional subject suggests that the 
scope of the Fundamental Law somehow extends to the whole of historical, pre-WWI Hungary, and 
certainly to those places where Hungarians are still living today. This suggestion is not without its 
constitutional consequences: the Fundamental Law makes the right to vote accessible to those members 
of the ‘united Hungarian nation’ who live outside the territory of Hungary. It gives a say in who should 
make up the Hungarian legislature to people who are not subject to the laws of Hungary.  
b) It characterises the nation referred to as the subject of the constitution as a Christian community, 
narrowing even further the range of people who can recognise themselves as belonging to it. ‘We 
recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood’, it declares, not only as a statement of 
historical fact, but also with respect to the present. And it expects everyone who wishes to identify with 
the constitution to also identify with its opening entreaty: ‘God bless the Hungarians’. 
c) The preamble of the Fundamental Law also claims that the ‘continuity’ of Hungarian statehood lasted 
from the country’s beginnings until the German occupation of the country on 19 March 1944, but was 
then interrupted only to be restored on 2 May 1990, the day of the first session of the freely elected 
Parliament. Thus, it rejects not only the communist dictatorship, but also the Temporary National 
Assembly convened at the end of 1944, which split with the fallen regime. It rejects the national 
assembly election of December 1945.  
3. Intervention into the right to privacy. The Fundamental Law breaks with a distinguishing feature of 
constitutions of rule-of- law states, namely, that they comprise the methods of exercising public 
authority and the limitations on such authority on the one hand and the guarantees of the enforcement 
of fundamental rights on the other. Instead of this, the text brings several elements of private life under 
its regulatory purview in a manner that is not doctrinally neutral, but is based on a Christian-conservative 
ideology. With this, it prescribes for the members of the community a life model based on the normative 
preferences that fit in with this ideology in the form of their obligations towards the community. These 
values, which are not doctrinally neutral, in other words they are nonliberal in the Walkerian sense 
discussed earlier, and feature as high up as the Fundamental Law’s preamble entitled National Avowal:  
‘We recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood.’ 
‘We hold that individual freedom can only be complete in cooperation with others.’ ‘We hold that the 
family and the nation constitute the principal framework of our coexistence, and that our fundamental 
cohesive values are fidelity, faith and love’. 
‘Our Fundamental Law ... expresses the nation’s will and the form in which we want to live.’ In other 
words, these values are illiberal in the Orbánian sense quoted earlier. 
4. Weakening of the protection of fundamental rights. The decline in the level of protection for 
fundamental rights is significantly influenced not only by the substantive provisions of the Fundamental 
Law pertaining to fundamental rights, but also by weakening of institutional and procedural guarantees 
that would otherwise be capable of upholding those rights that remain under the Fundamental Law. The 
most important of these is a change to the review power of the Constitutional Court, making it far less 
capable than before of performing its tasks related to the protection of fundamental rights. Added to this 
is the change in the composition of the Constitutional Court, taking place prior to the entry into force of 
the Fundamental Law, which further impeded it in fulfilling its function as protector of fundamental 
rights. 
5. Constitutional entrenchment of political preferences. The new Fundamental Law regulates some 
issues which are to be decided by the governing majority, while it assigns others to laws requiring a 
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two-third majority. This makes it possible for the current government enjoying a two-thirds majority 
support to write in stone its views on economic and social policy. A subsequent government possessing 
only a simple majority will not be able to alter these even if it receives a clear mandate from the 
electorate to do so. In addition, the prescriptions of the Fundamental Law render fiscal policy especially 
rigid since significant shares of state revenues and expenditures are impossible to be modified in the 
absence of pertaining two-third statutes. This hinders good governance since it makes more difficult for 
subsequent governments to respond to changes in the economy. This can make efficient crisis 
management impossible. The very possibility created by the Fundamental Law to regulate such issues 
of economic and social policies by means of two-third statutes is incompatible with parliamentarism 
and the principle of the temporal division of powers. 
On 11 March 2013, the Hungarian Parliament added the Fourth Amendment to the country’s 2011 
constitution, re-enacting a number of controversial provisions that had been annulled by the 
Constitutional Court. The most alarming change concerning the Constitutional Court was the decision 
to annul all Court decisions prior to when the Fundamental Law entered into force. At one level, this 
would have made sense, but the Constitutional Court had already worked out a sensible new rule for the 
constitutional transition by deciding that in those cases where the language of the old and new 
constitutions was substantially the same, the opinions of the prior Court would still be valid and could 
still be applied. In cases in which the new constitution was substantially different from the old one, the 
previous decisions would no longer be used. Constitutional rights are key provisions that are the same 
in the old and new constitutions – which means that, practically speaking, the Fourth Amendment annuls 
primarily the cases that defined and protected constitutional rights and harmonised domestic rights 
protections to comply with European human rights law. With the removal of these fundamental 
Constitutional Court decisions, the government has undermined legal security with respect to the 
protection of constitutional rights in Hungary.  
Poland 
Poland’s 1989 negotiated democratic transition preceded Hungary’s, but it followed Hungary’s 
constitutional backsliding after the Law and Justice Party (known as PiS), led by Jarosław Kaczyński, 
won parliamentary elections in October 2015. The party had already taken over the presidency in May 
that year. After Solidarity, led by the proletarian leader Lech Wałęsa, won massive electoral support in 
partially free elections held in June 1989, Poland’s last communist president, General Jaruzelski – based 
on an arrangement known as ‘your president, our prime minister’ – was forced to appoint Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Wałęsa’s former leading adviser, a liberal intellectual nominated by Solidarity, as prime 
minister. At the end of 1990, Jarosław Kaczyński ran Wałęsa’s winning campaign for the presidency 
and was rewarded with a position as the head of the presidential chancellery, but later accused him of 
betraying the revolution, and becoming ‘the president of the reds.’ Kaczyński’s conspiracy theory that 
liberal intellectuals had become allies to former communists led to a final split known as Solidarity’s 
‘war at the top.’129 The alleged conspiracy between other dissidents and the governing Polish United 
Workers party also determined how Kaczyński viewed the ‘roundtable’ agreement in 1989, which lead 
eventually to the end of the communist regime.130 The new government parties both in Hungary and 
Poland rejected ‘1989’ for the same reasons: namely, absence of radicalism of the democratic transition, 
and for the alleged liberation of the Communist elites.131  
As in Hungary in 1994, the fight among erstwhile Solidarity allies brought Poland’s former communists 
back into power: the Democratic Left Alliance, the successor to the Polish United Worker’s Party, won 
parliamentary elections and the presidency in 1993 and 1995 respectively. In contrast to their failed 
 
 129  Ch. Davis, ‘The Conspiracy Theorists who have taken over Poland’, The Guardian, 16 February 2016. 
 130  See J. Gross, ‘Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Party is Rewriting the History of Poland’, Financial Times, 13 March 2016. 
 131  See I. Krastev, ‘Walesa, Gorbatchev and Freedom’s End’, The New York Times, 14 March 2016. 
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attempt in Hungary in 1995–1996, the Polish post-communists and the liberals successfully negotiated 
a new liberal democratic constitution, enacted in 1997. Because the new document enshrined the 
Catholic church’s role in public life, illiberal conspiracy theorists charged that it provided additional 
evidence of a secret liberal-communist alliance. According to the conspiracists, there is no difference 
between liberal secularism and communist atheism or between liberal democracy and communist 
authoritarianism. This led in 2001 to the final division of Solidarity into two rival parties: Civic Platform 
(led by Donald Tusk), and Law and Justice (led by the Kaczyńskis, Jarosław and his twin brother, Lech), 
the former acknowledging, and the latter denying, the legitimacy of the new constitutional order.  
In 2005, Law and Justice defeated Civil Platform, and Tusk won both the parliamentary and the 
presidential elections. Lech Kaczyński became President of the Republic, while Jarosław became head 
of the coalition government, which consisted of Law and Justice, the agrarian-populist Self Defense 
Party and the nationalist-religious League of Polish Families. The new government proposed a 
decommunization law, which was partly annulled as unconstitutional by the still independent 
Constitutional Tribunal. The coalition fell apart in 2007, and Civic Platform won the subsequent 
elections. Donald Tusk replaced Jarosław Kaczyński as Prime Minister, while Lech remained President 
until he died after his plane crashed in the Katyn forest near Smolensk in Western Russia in April 2010. 
Although his support had collapsed by the beginning of 2010, and his chances of re-election at the end 
of the year were widely assumed to be very low, his death fed the theory of a conspiracy between then 
Poland’s Prime Minister Tusk and Russian President Putin willing to kill the Polish President.132  
Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party returned to power with a vengeance, committed to 
reshaping the entire constitutional system in order to create a ‘new and virtuous Fourth Republic.’ This 
meant a systemic and relentless annihilation of all independent powers that could check the will of the 
ultimate leader. In that respect, his role model is Viktor Orbán.133 In 2011, PiS published a long 
document, authored largely by Kaczyński himself, on the party’s and its leader’s vision of the state. The 
main proposition of this paper is very similar to the one that Orbán described in a speech in 2009: a 
well-ordered Poland should have a ‘centre of political direction,’ which would enforce the true national 
interest. This illiberal counter-revolution of both Orbán and Kaczyński is based on a Communist 
rejection of checks and balances, as well as constitutionally entrenched rights.134 
Unlike FIDESZ in 2011, PiS lacks the constitution-making or amending two-thirds majority in the 
Polish parliament. Therefore, it started to act by simply disregarding the liberal democratic Constitution 
of 1997. The first victim was the Constitutional Tribunal, which already in 2007 had struck down 
important elements of PiS’ legislative agenda, including limits on the privacy of public officials to be 
lustrated and freedom of speech and assembly.135 In Orbán’s playbook, which is seemingly followed by 
Kaczyński, the other major target has been the media, the civil service and the ordinary courts. As 
opposed to Hungary, for the dismantlement of liberal democratic institutions PiS does not really needed 
 
 132  I. Krastev, ’The Plane Crash Conspiracy Theory That Explains Poland’, Foreign Policy, 21 December 2015. On 10 April 
2016 at an event to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the crash, Jarosław Kaczyński said that “One wanted to kill our 
memory, as one was afraid of it. Because someone was responsible for the tragedy, at least in moral terms, irrespectively 
of what were its reasons…Donald Tusk’s government was responsible for that.” He added: “Forgiveness is necessary, but 
forgiveness after admitting guilt and administering proper punishment. This is what we need.” ‘Poland’s Kaczyński blames 
Tusk’s government for President’s Jet Crash’, Business Insider, 11 April 2016. In early October Kaczyński expressed his 
doubts that the Polish government will support Tusk for his second term in the European Council with the same explanation. 
See www.ft.com/content/d6a93538-8a36-11e6-8cb7-e7ada1d123b1?ftcamp=crm/email//nbe/BrusselsBrief/product. 
 133  As early as 2011 Kaczyński announced he wanted to create ‘Budapest in Warsaw.’ Cf. J-W. Müller, ‘The Problem with 
Poland’, The New York Review of Books, February 11, 2016. 
 134  Wojciech Sadurski, professor of constitutional law, who was the Kaczyński brothers’ fellow student at the University of 
Warsaw in the 1970s, says that this vision bears a striking resemblance to the writings of Stanislaw Ehrlich, their joint ex-
Marxist professor. See W. Sadurski, ‘What Make Kaczyński Tick?’, I•CONnect, 14 January 2016.  
 135  About the battle for the Constitutional Tribunal see T.T. Koncewicz, ’Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, 
Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense’, I•CONnect, December 6, 2015. 
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a new constitution because what they have been doing since the fall of 2015 is already a de facto change 
to the constitution through sub-constitutional laws. Wojciech Sadurski calls this a constitutional coup 
d’etat.136 
In October 2015, before the end of the term of the old Parliament, five judges had been nominated by 
the outgoing Civil Platform government, even though the nine-year terms of two of the judges would 
have expired only after the parliamentary elections. Andrzej Duda, the new President of the Republic 
nominated by PiS, refused to swear in the five new judges elected by the old Sejm, despite the fact that 
the terms of office for three of them had already started to run. In early December, in accordance with a 
new amendment to the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal, the new Sejm elected five new judges, who 
were sworn into office by President Duda in an overnight ceremony. As a reaction to these appointments, 
the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the election of two judges whose terms had not expired before the 
dissolution of the previous Sejm in October 2015 was unconstitutional. The Tribunal also ruled that the 
election of the other three judges was constitutional, and obliged the President to swear them in. Since 
President Duda refused to do so, the chief judge of the Tribunal did not allow the five newly elected 
judges to hear cases.  
The governing majority also passed an amendment regarding the organisation of the Tribunal, increasing 
the number of judges required to be in attendance from 9 out of 15 to 13 out of 15. It also required 
decisions of the Tribunal to be taken by a two-thirds majority, rather than a simple majority, which was 
the existing rule prior to the amendment. With the five new judges, as well as the one remaining judge 
appointed by the PiS when it was last in government from 2005 to 2007, it may no longer be possible 
for the Tribunal to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority to quash the new laws. The six-member 
PiS faction, combined with the new quorum and majority rules, will be enough to stymie the court. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal is bound to handle cases according to the date of receipt, meaning it must 
hear all the pending cases, most likely regarding laws enacted by previous parliaments, before any new 
ones adopted by the new Sejm. For the same reason, the amendment also states that no decision about 
the constitutionality of a law can be made until the law has been in force for six months. Disciplinary 
proceedings against a judge can also be initiated in the future by the President of the Republic or by the 
Minister of Justice, which gives power to officials loyal to PiS to institute the dismissal of judges. In 
early March 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal invalidated all of the pieces of the law restricting its 
competences. The government immediately announced that it would not publish the ruling because the 
Court had made its decision in violation of the very law it invalidated. By Polish law, the decision of 
the Court takes effect as soon as it is published. If the decision is not published, it cannot take effect. As 
a reaction to the government’s (lack of) action, the General Assembly of Poland’s Supreme Court judges 
adopted a resolution stating that the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal should be respected, in spite 
of a deadlock with the government. The councils of the cities of Warsaw, Lodz and Poznan have 
resolved to respect the Constitutional Tribunal’s decisions, in spite of the fact that the government is not 
publishing its rulings.137  
At the end of 2016, the Polish parliament adopted three new laws that permitted the President of the 
Republic to name a temporary Constitutional Tribunal President to replace the outgoing head of the 
court. The new interim President’s first action was to allow the three so-called ‘anti-judges’, unlawfully 
elected by the PiS majority in the Sejm, to assume their judicial duties suspended by the previous 
Tribunal President and participate in the meeting to nominate a new President to the head of the state, 
who two days later appointed the temporary President as the new permanent President of the Tribunal. 
With this the Constitutional Tribunal has been captured.  
 
 136  M. Steinbeis, ’What is Going on in Poland is an Attack against Democracy’, Interview with Wojciech Sadurski, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/what-is-going-on-in-poland-is-an-attack-against-democracy/ 
 137  http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/250415,Polands-Supreme-Court-opposes-government-in-constitutional-wrangle 
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In Orbán’s playbook, which is seemingly followed by Kaczyński, the other major target has been the 
media. At the end of 2015, the PiS government introduced a new law, the so-called ‘small media law’, 
amending the former Law on Radio and Television Broadcasting. This amendment enabled the 
government to appoint and dismiss the heads of the public television and radio. According to the new 
rules, the presidents and members of the board of both institutions are to be appointed and dismissed by 
the Minister of Treasury instead of the National Broadcasting Council from among multiple candidates. 
The law also terminated the previous managers’ and board members’ contracts with immediate effect, 
allowing the government to replace them. Since the ‘small media law’ was about to expire on 30 June 
2016, the government in April submitted the ‘large media law’ to the Sejm. The draft bill planned to 
turn public broadcasters into ‘national media’, which is obliged to spread the views of the Polish 
parliament, government and president, and have to ‘respect Christian values and universal ethical 
principles’. The national media entities are supervised by the newly established National Media Council.  
The third danger to PiS’ ‘centre of political direction’ has been an apolitical civil service. Here 
Kaczyński, just like Orbán, started the complete politicization of the civil service by removing a 
previously existing rule that the new head of the civil service must be a person who has not been a 
member of a political party for the last five years. The same law also allows the new head to be appointed 
from outside the civil service. Another element of Orbán’s agenda was to build up a surveillance state. 
In early February 2016, the new Polish Parliament also passed a controversial surveillance law that 
grants the government greater access to digital data and broader use of surveillance for law enforcement. 
On 13 June 2016, the Venice Commission issued an opinion on this, criticising the government for 
exercising nearly unlimited capacities without adequate independent checks or reasonable limits to the 
law.138  
The next target was the ordinary judiciary. In the summer of 2017, the government rushed three new 
legislative acts through the Polish Parliament: (a) The law on the Supreme Court; (b) the Law on the 
National Council for the Judiciary; and (c) the Law on the Ordinary Courts’ Organisation. The first two 
laws were vetoed but the third adopted139. The latter alone is enough to undermine the independence of 
Polish courts by permitting the government to replace the leadership of the lower courts. 
In early May 2016, Jarosław Kaczyński announced his party’s aim to change the 1997 Constitution: ‘the 
constitution must be verified every twenty years’, hinting ‘next year will be the 20th anniversary of 
Poland’s contemporary basic law’. He admitted however that ‘we might not find enough support to 
change the constitution this term, but it’s time to start to work. We can ask Poles if they prefer Poland 
that we’ve all seen or the one that’s ahead of us’.140 A day later Polish President Andrzej Duda said the 
country’s current constitution was a ‘constitution of a time of transition’, adding that ‘it should be 
examined, a thorough evaluation carried out and a new solution drawn up’.141 On 3 May 2017, on the 
anniversary of the 1791 Polish constitution, President Duda announced that he wanted to hold a 
referendum in 2018 on the current constitution. His stated reason was that the present Polish people 
should decide what kind of constitution they wanted, how strong the president and parliament should 
be, and which rights and freedoms should be emphasized.142 These references to a new basic law leave 
open how the party intends to circumvent the lack of the necessary two-thirds majority in the Sejm for 
constitution-making. But as critics argue, PiS does not really need a new constitution because what they 
have been doing since the fall of 2015 is already a de facto change to the constitution through sub-
constitutional laws.  
 
 138  http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)012-e 
 139  As Wojciech Sadurski argued President Duda’s bills tabled to replace the laws vetoed by him are as unconstitotonal as the 
orginal ones. See W. Sadurski, ’Judicial „Reform” in Poland: The President’s Bills are as Unconstitutional as the Ones he 
Vetoed’, Verfassungsblog, 28 November 2017.  
 140  http://uatoday.tv/news/poland-may-soon-change-its-constitution-j-kaczy-ski-642126.html 
 141  http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/251184,Polish-president-calls-for-constitution-to-be-reexamined 
 142  http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/03/on-anniversary-of-first-constitution-polish-president-calls-for-referendum/ 
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Conclusion 
In the first part of this paper, I tried to answer the question, whether there is a genuine constitutional 
theory of ‘illiberal constitutionalism’? I argued that the constitutional concept, which rejects liberalism 
as a constitutive precondition of democracy, cannot be in compliance with the traditional idea of liberal 
democratic constitutionalism. This concept has nothing to do with any majoritarian constitutional model 
based on the separation of power, or with political constitutionalism, or any kind of weak judicial review, 
and it misuses the concept of constitutional identity.  
The second part of the paper investigated the social, economic and political relations of illiberal 
societies. Regarding the first I found that there has been a very weak historical tradition of liberalism 
and modernization in the East-Central European societies, and also the main driving force of the 
transition to liberal democracy was to reach the living standard of the West. The lack of success to 
achieve this goal, together with the accumulation of wealth by some former members of the Communist 
nomenclature, and the failures of redistributive justice efforts were the reasons of disappointment also 
in the liberal democratic pursuits. Regarding the economic relations the rise of economic inequality and 
the decline of social security and solidarity has paradoxically partly been caused by the neoliberal 
economic policy of some of the illiberal political forces. These political actors have changed the entire 
political and constitutional structure into a illiberal system mostly not based on their ideological 
conviction, but rather for the sake of building up and keeping an unrestrained power.  
One of the reasons of the illiberal turn has been that there was a lack of consensus about liberal 
democratic values at the time of the transition. In the beginning of the democratic transitions in these 
new democracies, preference was given to general economic effectiveness over mass civic and political 
engagement.143 The satisfaction of basic economic needs was so important for both ordinary people and 
the new political elites that constitutions did not really make a difference.144 Between 1989 and 2004, 
all political forces accepted a certain minimalistic version of a ‘liberal consensus’, understood as a set 
of rules and laws rather than values, according to which NATO and EU accession were the main political 
goals. But as soon as the main political goals were achieved, the liberal consensus died,145 and full 
democratic consolidation was never achieved.146  
An initial failure of the 1989 constitutional changes - namely the disproportional election systems - also 
contributed to the electoral victories of Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland, the illiberal autocratic 
forces. In the case of Fidesz 53 percent vote share into 68 percent in 2010 and 45.5 percent into 67 
percent of the seats in Parliament in 2014. This made Fidesz able to change the entire constitutional 
system after its electoral success in 2010. PiS in 2015 got 51 percent of the seats in the Sejm for 37.6 
percent of the votes. With their absolute majority they were able to enact laws- after packing the 
Constitutional Tribunal even unconstitutional ones - without any need to consult with their 
parliamentary opposition.  
According to some authors, the prospects for liberal constitutional democracy in the newly independent 
states of Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989–90 transition were diminished by a 
technocratic, judicial control of politics, which blunted the development of civic constitutionalism, civil 
society, and participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the technocratic 
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machinery of legal constitutionalism.147 Adherents to this viewpoint argue that the legalistic form of 
constitutionalism (or legal constitutionalism), while consistent with the purpose of creating the structure 
of the state and setting boundaries between the state and citizens, jeopardised the development of 
participatory democracy.148 In other words, legal constitutionalism fell short, reducing the Constitution 
to an elite instrument, especially in countries with weak civil societies and weak political party systems 
that undermine a robust constitutional democracy based on the idea of civic self-government.149 
One can raise the hypothetical question whether earlier and more inclusive or participatory constitution-
making processes could have ensured the durability of democratic institutions. Indeed, there was no 
early constitution making, and the amendment processes that happened instead were not participatory. 
Neither Poland nor Hungary enacted a new constitution right after the democratic transitions of 1989. 
Instead, in both countries as a result of the Round Table negotiations, between the representatives of the 
authoritarian Communist regime and their democratic opposition, the illegitimate legislature was put in 
the position of enacting modifications to the old Stalinist constitutions. This was done based on the elite 
agreement without any consultation with the people. In the case of Poland, the 1952 Constitution was 
slightly modified in April 1989, while in Hungary the 1949 Constitution was comprehensively amended 
in October 1989. This was called by Andrew Arato ‘post-sovereign’ constitution-making.150 It is true 
that in Poland, the democratically elected Parliament enacted the so called Small Constitution in 1992, 
but it only changed some elements of the state organization, without the ambition of becoming the final 
closing act of the democratic transition. The new constitution was only enacted in 1997, again without 
participatory process, like a referendum. In Hungary, a similar new constitution-making effort failed in 
1996, and even though the content of the 1989 comprehensive amendment fulfilled the requirements of 
a liberal democratic constitution, but its heading had 1949 in it. With that Fidesz after its electoral victory 
in 2010 could claim the need to enact a new constitution of the democratic transition and it had all the 
votes to enact what it was wishing to. But this wasn’t a liberal democratic constitution anymore. 
One can only speculate, whether an earlier and more participatory constitution-making would have been 
a guarantee against backsliding. There is nothing to suggest that an earlier and more participatory 
constitution-making process would have prevented the populist turn. As the Polish example proves even 
the existence of a liberal democratic constitution does not constitute an obstacle against backlash. In my 
view, those proponents of participatory constitutionalism who argue that with participation backsliding 
would not necessarily have happened, do not sufficiently take into account the rise of populism and the 
lack of civic interest in constitutional matters, due to poor constitutional culture.151  
So far the liberal elite seems to be unable to protect the liberal democratic ideals, which certainly 
indicates that the special historical circumstances require a longer period of time the build up a liberal 
democratic political and constitutional culture. But the democratic backsliding is not a proof of the 
failure of liberal democracy altogether, as illiberal leaders and their court ideologists want people to 
believe. 
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